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Synchronicity and firm interlocks in an emerging market

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  • Khanna, Tarun
  • Thomas, Catherine

Abstract

Stock price synchronicity has been attributed to poor corporate governance and a lack of firm-level transparency. This paper investigates the association between different kinds of firm interlocks, control groups, and synchronicity in Chile. A unique data set containing equity cross-holdings, common individual owners, and director interlocks is used to map out firm ties and control groups. While there is a correlation between synchronicity and share ownership and equity ties, synchronicity is more strongly correlated with interlocking directorates. The presence of share directors is associated with either reduced firm-level transparency or increased correlation in firm fundamentals--due, for example, to joint resource allocation across the firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Khanna, Tarun & Thomas, Catherine, 2009. "Synchronicity and firm interlocks in an emerging market," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(2), pages 182-204, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:92:y:2009:i:2:p:182-204
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    References listed on IDEAS

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