IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jfinec/v169y2025ics0304405x25000613.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Data sales and data dilution

Author

Listed:
  • Liu, Ernest
  • Ma, Song
  • Veldkamp, Laura

Abstract

We explore indicators of market power in a data market. Markups cannot measure competition, because most data products’ marginal cost is zero, making the markup infinite. Yet, data monopolists may not exert monopoly power because they cannot commit to restricting data sales to future customers. This limited commitment and strategic substitutability of data undermine sellers’ monopoly power. But data subscriptions restore this monopoly power. Evidence from online data markets supports the model’s insight that subscriptions indicate market power. Model and evidence reveal that data subscriptions are better for consumers because they sustain the incentive to invest in high-quality data.

Suggested Citation

  • Liu, Ernest & Ma, Song & Veldkamp, Laura, 2025. "Data sales and data dilution," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 169(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:169:y:2025:i:c:s0304405x25000613
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104053
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304405X25000613
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104053?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti & Alex Smolin, 2018. "The Design and Price of Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 108(1), pages 1-48, January.
    2. Green, Daniel & Liu, Ernest, 2021. "A dynamic theory of multiple borrowing," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 139(2), pages 389-404.
    3. Richard Arnott & Joseph Stiglitz, 1993. "Price Equilibrium, Efficiency, And Decentralizability In Insurance Markets With Moral Hazard," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 254, Boston College Department of Economics.
    4. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2013. "Robust Predictions in Games With Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(4), pages 1251-1308, July.
    5. Grossman, Sanford J & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1980. "On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(3), pages 393-408, June.
    6. Christian Hellwig & Sebastian Kohls & Laura Veldkamp, 2012. "Information Choice Technologies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(3), pages 35-40, May.
    7. Toni M. Whited & Guojun Wu, 2006. "Financial Constraints Risk," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 19(2), pages 531-559.
    8. Lin William Cong & Danxia Xie & Longtian Zhang, 2021. "Knowledge Accumulation, Privacy, and Growth in a Data Economy," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(10), pages 6480-6492, October.
    9. Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti, 2024. "Data, Competition, and Digital Platforms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 114(8), pages 2553-2595, August.
    10. Peter M. Demarzo & Zhiguo He, 2021. "Leverage Dynamics without Commitment," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 76(3), pages 1195-1250, June.
    11. Charles J. Hadlock & Joshua R. Pierce, 2010. "New Evidence on Measuring Financial Constraints: Moving Beyond the KZ Index," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 23(5), pages 1909-1940.
    12. repec:cwl:cwldpp:1821rrr is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Shota Ichihashi, 2020. "Online Privacy and Information Disclosure by Consumers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 110(2), pages 569-595, February.
    14. Charles I. Jones & Christopher Tonetti, 2020. "Nonrivalry and the Economics of Data," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 110(9), pages 2819-2858, September.
    15. Markus K. Brunnermeier & Martin Oehmke, 2013. "The Maturity Rat Race," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 68(2), pages 483-521, April.
    16. Ilya Segal, 1999. "Contracting with Externalities," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 114(2), pages 337-388.
    17. Rishabh Kirpalani & Thomas Philippon, 2020. "Data Sharing and Market Power with Two-Sided Platforms," NBER Working Papers 28023, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Ma, Song & Murfin, Justin & Pratt, Ryan, 2022. "Young firms, old capital," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 146(1), pages 331-356.
    19. Kai Hao Yang, 2022. "Selling Consumer Data for Profit: Optimal Market-Segmentation Design and Its Consequences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 112(4), pages 1364-1393, April.
    20. Admati, Anat R. & Pfleiderer, Paul, 1986. "A monopolistic market for information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 400-438, August.
    21. Richard Arnott & Joseph Stiglitz, 1991. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets with Moral Hazard," NBER Working Papers 3588, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    22. Admati, Anat R & Pfleiderer, Paul, 1990. "Direct and Indirect Sale of Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(4), pages 901-928, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Agur, Itai & Ari, Anil & Dell’Ariccia, Giovanni, 2025. "Bank competition and household privacy in a digital payment monopoly," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 166(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Alessandro Bonatti, 2023. "The Platform Dimension of Digital Privacy," NBER Chapters, in: The Economics of Privacy, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Bergemann, Dirk & Ottaviani, Marco, 2021. "Information Markets and Nonmarkets," CEPR Discussion Papers 16459, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Bonatti, Alessandro & Dahleh, Munther & Horel, Thibaut & Nouripour, Amir, 2024. "Selling information in competitive environments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 216(C).
    4. Teddy Mekonnen & Bobak Pakzad-Hurson, 2024. "Competition, Persuasion, and Search," Papers 2411.11183, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2025.
    5. Padilla, Jorge & Piccolo, Salvatore & Vasconcelos, Helder, 2021. "Should vertically integrated platforms be mandated to share information with their rivals?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 203(C).
    6. Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti, 2019. "Markets for Information: An Introduction," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 11(1), pages 85-107, August.
    7. Cong, Lin William & Wei, Wenshi & Xie, Danxia & Zhang, Longtian, 2022. "Endogenous growth under multiple uses of data," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 141(C).
    8. Flavio Pino, 2022. "The microeconomics of data – a survey," Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, Springer;Associazione Amici di Economia e Politica Industriale, vol. 49(3), pages 635-665, September.
    9. Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti, 2024. "Data, Competition, and Digital Platforms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 114(8), pages 2553-2595, August.
    10. Shota Ichihashi & Alexey Smolin, 2022. "Data Collection by an Informed Seller," Working Papers hal-04954135, HAL.
    11. Gabriel Desgranges & Celine Rochon, 2008. "Conformism, Public News and Market Effciency," OFRC Working Papers Series 2008fe16, Oxford Financial Research Centre.
    12. Shota Ichihashi & Alex Smolin, 2022. "Data Provision to an Informed Seller," Papers 2204.08723, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2023.
    13. Daron Acemoglu & Ali Makhdoumi & Azarakhsh Malekian & Asu Ozdaglar, 2022. "Too Much Data: Prices and Inefficiencies in Data Markets," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(4), pages 218-256, November.
    14. Shiyang Huang & Yan Xiong & Liyan Yang, 2022. "Skill Acquisition and Data Sales," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(8), pages 6116-6144, August.
    15. Subrahmanyam, Avanidhar, 2009. "Optimal financial education," Review of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 1-9, January.
    16. Gabriel Desgranges & Céline Rochon, 2013. "Conformism and public news," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 52(3), pages 1061-1090, April.
    17. Dang, Tri Vi & Felgenhauer, Mike, 2012. "Information provision in over-the-counter markets," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 79-96.
    18. Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti & Tan Gan, 2022. "The economics of social data," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 53(2), pages 263-296, June.
    19. Yang, Jun & Yang, Dingjian & Cheng, Jixin, 2024. "The non-rivalry of data, directed technical change and the environment: A theoretical study incorporating data as a production factor," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 417-448.
    20. Jiadong Gu, 2024. "Data Trade and Consumer Privacy," Papers 2406.12457, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2024.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
    • D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:169:y:2025:i:c:s0304405x25000613. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505576 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.