Principal-agent contracts in continuous time asymmetric information models the importance of large continuing information flows
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- Bengt Holmstrom & Paul R. Milgrom, 1985.
"Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
742, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1987. "Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(2), pages 303-28, March.
- Margaret A. Meyer, 1991. "Learning from Coarse Information: Biased Contests and Career Profiles," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 58(1), pages 15-41.
- Perron, P., 1987.
"Test Consistency with Varying Sampling Frequency,"
Cahiers de recherche
8752, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Bollerslev, Tim & Engle, Robert F & Wooldridge, Jeffrey M, 1988. "A Capital Asset Pricing Model with Time-Varying Covariances," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(1), pages 116-31, February.
- Radner, Roy, 1985. "Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Discounting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(5), pages 1173-98, September.
- Radner, R., 1990. "Linear Models Of Economic Survival Under Production Uncertainty," Papers 427, Cornell - Department of Economics.
- Radner, Roy, 1989. "Dynamic Games in Organization Theory," Working Paper Series 228, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised Feb 1991.
- Nelson, Daniel B., 1992. "Filtering and forecasting with misspecified ARCH models I : Getting the right variance with the wrong model," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 52(1-2), pages 61-90.
- Dutta, Prajit K & Radner, Roy, 1994. "Optimal Principal Agent Contracts for a Class of Incentive Schemes: A Characterization and the Rate of Approach to Efficiency," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 4(4), pages 483-503, May.
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