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Polycentricity and adaptation: A multilevel selectionist approach

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  • Schaefer, Alexander

Abstract

Polycentric organizations allow highly functional, or “group-beneficial,” outcomes to emerge from the myopic behavior of rule-guided individuals. How does polycentricity achieve this feat? Drawing on multilevel selection theory, I argue that polycentric orders support successful outcomes by defining group boundaries and reducing within-group fitness variance relative to between-group variance. The Price equation suggests that, by doing so, polycentric orders facilitate a process of collectively beneficial adaptation, including the capacity to evolve mechanisms for monitoring and punishing rule violators.

Suggested Citation

  • Schaefer, Alexander, 2023. "Polycentricity and adaptation: A multilevel selectionist approach," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 210(C), pages 265-287.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:210:y:2023:i:c:p:265-287
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2023.04.004
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Snower, Dennis J., 2025. "Labor Markets as Human Ecosystems: The Insider-Outsider Theory Reconsidered," IZA Discussion Papers 18202, IZA Network @ LISER.
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    3. Dennis J. Snower, 2025. "The Insider-Outsider Theory Reconsidered: Labor Markets as Human Ecosystems," CESifo Working Paper Series 12324, CESifo.

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