Identity, non-take-up and welfare conditionality
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Gerards, Ruud & Welters, Ricardo, 2016.
"Impact of financial pressure on unemployed job search, job find success and job quality,"
ROA Research Memorandum
008, Maastricht University, Research Centre for Education and the Labour Market (ROA).
- Gerards, Ruud & Welters, Ricardo, 2016. "Impact of financial pressure on unemployed job search, job find success and job quality," Research Memorandum 022, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
- Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1992. "Workfare versus Welfare Incentive Arguments for Work Requirements in Poverty-Alleviation Programs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 249-261, March.
- Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1992.
"Understanding welfare stigma: Taxpayer resentment and statistical discrimination,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 165-183, July.
- Besley, T. & Coate, S., 1990. "Understanding Welfare Stigma: Taxpayer Resentment And Statistical Discrimination," Papers 42, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Discussion Paper.
- Besley, Timothy, 1990. "Means Testing versus Universal Provision in Poverty Alleviation Programmes," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 57(225), pages 119-129, February.
- George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, 2000. "Economics and Identity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 115(3), pages 715-753.
- Gerard J. Berg & Johan Vikström, 2014.
"Monitoring Job Offer Decisions, Punishments, Exit to Work, and Job Quality,"
Scandinavian Journal of Economics,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 116(2), pages 284-334, April.
- van den Berg, Gerard J & Vikström, Johan, 2009. "Monitoring Job Offer Decisions, Punishments, Exit to Work, and Job Quality," CEPR Discussion Papers 7460, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- van den Berg, Gerard J. & Vikström, Johan, 2009. "Monitoring Job Offer Decisions, Punishments, Exit to Work, and Job Quality," IZA Discussion Papers 4325, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- van den Berg, Gerard J. & Vikström, Johan, 2009. "Monitoring job offer decisions, punishments, exit to work, and job quality," Working Paper Series 2009:18, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
- Marco Caliendo & Konstantinos Tatsiramos & Arne Uhlendorff, 2013.
"Benefit Duration, Unemployment Duration And Job Match Quality: A Regression‐Discontinuity Approach,"
Journal of Applied Econometrics,
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(4), pages 604-627, June.
- Marco Caliendo & Konstantinos Tatsiramos & Arne Uhlendorff, 2009. "Benefit Duration, Unemployment Duration and Job Match Quality: A Regression-Discontinuity Approach," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 967, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
- Caliendo, Marco & Tatsiramos, Konstantinos & Uhlendorff, Arne, 2009. "Benefit Duration, Unemployment Duration and Job Match Quality: A Regression-Discontinuity Approach," IZA Discussion Papers 4670, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Geanakoplos, John & Pearce, David & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1989. "Psychological games and sequential rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 60-79, March.
- Moffitt, Robert, 1983. "An Economic Model of Welfare Stigma," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(5), pages 1023-1035, December.
- Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2009.
"Dynamic psychological games,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 1-35, January.
- Pierpaolo Battigalli & Martin Dufwenberg, 2005. "Dynamic Psychological Games," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000046, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Pierpaolo Battigalli & Martin Dufwenberg, 2005. "Dynamic Psychological Games," Working Papers 287, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Cockx, Bart & Ghirelli, Corinna & Van der Linden, Bruno, 2014. "Is it socially efficient to impose job search requirements on unemployed benefit claimants with hyperbolic preferences?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 80-95.
- Bernheim, B Douglas, 1994. "A Theory of Conformity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(5), pages 841-877, October.
- Janet Currie & Firouz Gahvari, 2008.
"Transfers in Cash and In-Kind: Theory Meets the Data,"
Journal of Economic Literature,
American Economic Association, vol. 46(2), pages 333-383, June.
- Janet Currie & Firouz Gahvari, 2007. "Transfers in Cash and In Kind: Theory Meets the Data," NBER Working Papers 13557, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
More about this item
KeywordsIdentity cost; Reflected appraisals; Non-take-up; Welfare conditionality;
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:147:y:2018:i:c:p:13-27. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.