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The allocation of entrepreneurial efforts in a rent-seeking society: Evidence from China

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  • Dong, Zhiqiang
  • Wei, Xiahai
  • Zhang, Yongjing

Abstract

This paper considers four types of entrepreneurial efforts: productive activities, aggressive rent seeking, defense against rent extraction, and leisure. It examines how entrepreneurs allocate efforts when facing dual-dealing relationships with politicians in a rent-seeking society: entrepreneurs not only pursue additional benefits through rent seeking, but also try to avoid extortions by politicians. Using unique city-level and firm-level data across China, we demonstrate that Chinese entrepreneurs survive in a twisted world: ordinary entrepreneurs would desire better institutional environment, but if institutional improvement is not available, they would prefer political connections which are often preoccupied by special interest groups and/or large-sized firms.

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  • Dong, Zhiqiang & Wei, Xiahai & Zhang, Yongjing, 2016. "The allocation of entrepreneurial efforts in a rent-seeking society: Evidence from China," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 353-371.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jcecon:v:44:y:2016:i:2:p:353-371
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jce.2015.02.004
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    14. Zhifang Zhou & Lingyan Zhang & Li Lin & Huixiang Zeng & Xiaohong Chen, 2020. "Carbon risk management and corporate competitive advantages: “Differential promotion” or “cost hindrance”?," Business Strategy and the Environment, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(4), pages 1764-1784, May.
    15. Xu, Gang & Yano, Go, 2017. "How does anti-corruption affect corporate innovation? Evidence from recent anti-corruption efforts in China," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 498-519.
    16. Fu, Tong & Jian, Ze, 2018. "Property rights protection, financial access and corporate R&D: Evidence from a large representative sample of Chinese firms," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 332-345.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Entrepreneurship; Rent extraction; Rent seeking;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • L26 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Entrepreneurship
    • P26 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Property Rights

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