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Blockholder board representation and debt contracting

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  • Marquardt, Blair B.
  • Sanchez, Juan Manuel

Abstract

We examine the impact of blockholder board representation on a borrower's bank loan contract terms and find it is associated with lower spreads and fewer negative covenants. When examining the potential channels behind the relationship, we find that blockholder-directors who take dedicated monitoring roles, as opposed to the short-term or confrontational positions often associated with activist shareholders, drive the overall relationship. The findings, which are robust to alternative model specifications and explanations, suggest that blockholder-directors can serve as substitute monitors to debtholders when their incentives are aligned. The results also highlight the heterogeneity among blockholders who actively influence the management process.

Suggested Citation

  • Marquardt, Blair B. & Sanchez, Juan Manuel, 2022. "Blockholder board representation and debt contracting," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 142(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:142:y:2022:i:c:s0378426622001406
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2022.106546
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Blockholders; Cost of debt; Debt covenants; Shareholder activism; Board composition;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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