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Optimal inflation target under uncertainty

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  • Uchida, Hirofumi
  • Fujiki, Hiroshi

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  • Uchida, Hirofumi & Fujiki, Hiroshi, 2005. "Optimal inflation target under uncertainty," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 470-479, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:japwor:v:17:y:2005:i:4:p:470-479
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
    2. Svensson, Lars E O, 1997. "Optimal Inflation Targets, "Conservative" Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(1), pages 98-114, March.
    3. Beetsma, Roel & Bovenberg, A Lans, 1999. "Inflation Targets and Debt Accumulation in a Monetary Union," CEPR Discussion Papers 2324, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. repec:fth:tilbur:99108 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Beetsma, Roel M. W. J. & Lans Bovenberg, A., 1997. "Designing fiscal and monetary institutions in a second-best world," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 53-79, February.
    6. McCallum, Bennett T, 1995. "Two Fallacies Concerning Central-Bank Independence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 207-211, May.
    7. Henrik Jensen & Roel M. W. J. Beetsma, 1999. "Optimal Inflation Targets, "Conservative" Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 342-347, March.
    8. Roel Beetsma & Lans Bovenberg, 2001. "When Does an Inflation Target Yield the Second Best?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 103(1), pages 119-126, March.
    9. Beetsma, Roel M. W. J. & Bovenberg, A. Lans, 1997. "Central bank independence and public debt policy," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 21(4-5), pages 873-894, May.
    10. Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
    11. repec:bla:scandj:v:103:y:2001:i:1:p:119-26 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Walsh, Carl E, 1995. "Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 150-167, March.
    13. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Aleksandra Halka, 2015. "Lessons from the crisis.Did central banks do their homework?," NBP Working Papers 224, Narodowy Bank Polski.
    2. Fujiki, Hiroshi & Uchida, Hirofumi, 2011. "Inflation target and debt management of local government bonds," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 178-189.
    3. Aleksandra Halka, 2016. "How the central bank’s reaction function in small open economies evolved during the crisis," Bank i Kredyt, Narodowy Bank Polski, vol. 47(4), pages 301-318.

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