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Unlikely sabotage: Comment on Bloomfield, Marvão, and Spagnolo

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  • Karpoff, Jonathan M.

Abstract

Bloomfield, Marvão, and Spagnolo (2023) establish an interesting yet puzzling finding: Firms in concentrated industries that form cartels are more likely to use relative performance evaluation (RPE) compensation arrangements for their top managers. The paper interprets this as evidence that cartel members constrain managers' incentives to engage in costly sabotage when their compensation depends on their peer firms' performance. I argue that successful costly sabotage to gain an RPE advantage is extremely unlikely and that costly sabotage is more likely among cartel firms than non-cartel firms. It therefore is an unlikely explanation of the paper's main finding. I propose an alternative explanation, that RPE benchmarks include firms that are not cartel member firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Karpoff, Jonathan M., 2023. "Unlikely sabotage: Comment on Bloomfield, Marvão, and Spagnolo," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(2).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jaecon:v:76:y:2023:i:2:s0165410123000307
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101606
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ross, Thomas W., 1992. "Cartel stability and product differentiation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 1-13, March.
    2. Ryan T. Ball & Jonathan Bonham & Thomas Hemmer, 2020. "Does it pay to ‘Be Like Mike’? Aspiratonal peer firms and relative performance evaluation," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 25(4), pages 1507-1541, December.
    3. Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, 1990. "Relative Performance Evaluation for Chief Executive Officers," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 43(3), pages 30, April.
    4. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1982. "Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 280-312, August.
    5. Bernard, Darren, 2016. "Is the risk of product market predation a cost of disclosure?," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 305-325.
    6. Klein, Benjamin & Crawford, Robert G & Alchian, Armen A, 1978. "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 297-326, October.
    7. Bruce H. Kobayashi, 2010. "The Law and Economics of Predatory Pricing," Chapters, in: Keith N. Hylton (ed.), Antitrust Law and Economics, chapter 6, Edward Elgar Publishing.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ha, Sangeun & Ma, Fangyuan & Žaldokas, Alminas, 2024. "Motivating collusion," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 154(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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