Corporate compensation policies and audit fees
Recent accounting research has started to investigate the links between corporate compensation and auditor compensation. Engel et al. (2010) take a first step to connect these previously distinct literatures by investigating the association between audit committee pay and audit fees. I discuss the findings of this study and then present complementary empirical evidence on the association between CEO compensation and audit fees. My descriptive empirical evidence suggests economically large co-variation in CEO compensation and audit fees. I conclude with suggestions for future research on the links between firms' corporate compensation and auditor compensation policies.
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