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Understanding public enforcement of securities law in China: An empirical analysis of the enforcement actions of the CSRC and its regional offices against informational misconduct

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  • Xu, Wenming
  • Xu, Guangdong

Abstract

This study examines the public enforcement (PE) of securities law in China. We exploit the external positive shock to enforcement intensity due to the reform decentralizing the authority to impose administrative sanctions (AS) and show that shares in the pilot project experience statistically significant, but economically insignificant, abnormal returns (AR). Furthermore, we examine the market reactions to PE actions against informational misconduct and find that shares receiving AS suffer an average AR of approximately -12.03 % over the (-1,5) event window, whereas those receiving non-AS experience economically insignificant AR. Next, we investigate the impacts of PE actions on the external debt financing, and show a significant decrease in external debt financing associated with firms receiving AS compared to those receiving non-AS. Finally, for the subsample of shares sanctioned by ROs, we find that firm size significantly reduces the likelihood of receiving AS, but neither governmental ownership nor political participation appears to have an effect.

Suggested Citation

  • Xu, Wenming & Xu, Guangdong, 2020. "Understanding public enforcement of securities law in China: An empirical analysis of the enforcement actions of the CSRC and its regional offices against informational misconduct," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:61:y:2020:i:c:s0144818819302601
    DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2019.105877
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    Cited by:

    1. Liu, Yan, 2023. "Essays on credit rating agencies in China," Other publications TiSEM b54b3315-1185-48b8-aaf8-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
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    4. Zeng, James Si, 2021. "Does regulation of defensive tactics with mandatory rules benefit shareholders? Evidence from event studies in China," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
    5. Jia, Haibo & Xue, Jun, 2024. "Relationship between administrative punishment and corporate debt financing," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    6. Wang, Yang & Ashton, John K. & Jaafar, Aziz, 2023. "Financial statement fraud, recidivism and punishment," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Event study; Information disclosure; Public enforcement; Regional offices; Securities law; Stock prices;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law

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