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The Deterrent Effect of the Securities and Exchange Commission's Enforcement Intensity on Illegal Insider Trading: Evidence from Run-up before News Events

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  • Diane Del Guercio
  • Elizabeth R. Odders-White
  • Mark J. Ready

Abstract

We examine whether public enforcement of US insider-trading laws affects price discovery. Examining insider-trading civil cases filed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) from 2003 to 2011, we find that the price impact on insider-trading days is much smaller than the effect documented for the 1980s, consistent with increased fear of prosecution. Moreover, we find that preannouncement anticipatory run-up in comprehensive samples of takeover bids and earnings announcements is negatively related to resource-based measures of public enforcement intensity, which suggests that aggressive SEC enforcement deters illegal activity. In addition, we find that quoted bid-ask spreads are negatively related to the SEC's enforcement intensity, which suggests that greater enforcement improves liquidity. Moreover, the negative and significant relation between run-up and the SEC's enforcement intensity persists after controlling for quoted spreads.

Suggested Citation

  • Diane Del Guercio & Elizabeth R. Odders-White & Mark J. Ready, 2017. "The Deterrent Effect of the Securities and Exchange Commission's Enforcement Intensity on Illegal Insider Trading: Evidence from Run-up before News Events," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 60(2), pages 269-307.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:doi:10.1086/693563
    DOI: 10.1086/693563
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    Cited by:

    1. Betzer, André & Gider, Jasmin & Limbach, Peter, 2022. "Do financial advisors matter for M&A pre-announcement returns?," CFR Working Papers 22-03, University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR).
    2. Aleksanyan, Mark & Danbolt, Jo & Siganos, Antonios & Wu, Betty (H.T.), 2022. "I only fear when I hear: How media affects insider trading in takeover targets," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 318-342.
    3. Chen, Shenglan & Ma, Hui & Wu, Qiang & Zhang, Hao, 2023. "Does common ownership constrain managerial rent extraction? Evidence from insider trading profitability," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 80(C).
    4. Calluzzo, Paul & Wang, Wei & Wu, Serena, 2021. "SEC scrutiny shopping," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    5. Cline, Brandon N. & Williamson, Claudia R. & Xiong, Haoyang, 2021. "Culture and the regulation of insider trading across countries," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    6. Ormazabal, Gaizka, 2018. "The Role of Stakeholders in Corporate Governance: A View from Accounting Research," CEPR Discussion Papers 12775, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Styliani Panetsidou & Angelos Synapis & Ioannis Tsalavoutas, 2022. "Price run-ups and insider trading laws under different regulatory environments," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 59(2), pages 601-639, August.
    8. Duong, Truong X. & Meschke, Felix, 2020. "The rise and fall of portfolio pumping among U.S. mutual funds," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    9. Pierce, Andrew T., 2024. "Capital-market effects of tipper-tippee insider trading law: Evidence from the Newman ruling," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(2).
    10. Cline, Brandon N. & Posylnaya, Valeriya V., 2019. "Illegal insider trading: Commission and SEC detection," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 247-269.
    11. Xu, Wenming & Xu, Guangdong, 2020. "Understanding public enforcement of securities law in China: An empirical analysis of the enforcement actions of the CSRC and its regional offices against informational misconduct," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).
    12. Ferhat Akbas & Chao Jiang & Paul D. Koch, 2020. "Insider Investment Horizon," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 75(3), pages 1579-1627, June.
    13. Patrick Augustin & Menachem Brenner & Marti G. Subrahmanyam, 2019. "Informed Options Trading Prior to Takeover Announcements: Insider Trading?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(12), pages 5697-5720, December.
    14. Davis, Frederick & Khadivar, Hamed, 2024. "Accrual and real earnings management by rumored takeover targets," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 92(C).
    15. Xiaomeng Charlene Chen & Ka Wai Choi & Sue Wright & Hai Wu, 2023. "The effectiveness of sanctions on disclosure regulation: Australian evidence," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 63(4), pages 3841-3872, December.
    16. Marie Dutordoir & Evangelos Vagenas‐Nanos & Patrick Verwijmeren & Betty Wu, 2021. "A rundown of merger target run‐ups," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 50(2), pages 487-518, June.
    17. Bessler, Wolfgang & Vendrasco, Marco, 2022. "Short-selling restrictions and financial stability in Europe: Evidence from the Covid-19 crisis," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 80(C).

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