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The German strategy for quality improvement in health care: still to improve

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  • Sauerland, Dirk

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  • Sauerland, Dirk, 2001. "The German strategy for quality improvement in health care: still to improve," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 127-147, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:hepoli:v:56:y:2001:i:2:p:127-147
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    1. Fredrik Carlsen & Jostein Grytten, 1998. "More physicians: improved availability or induced demand?," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 7(6), pages 495-508, September.
    2. Vick, Sandra & Scott, Anthony, 1998. "Agency in health care. Examining patients' preferences for attributes of the doctor-patient relationship," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(5), pages 587-605, October.
    3. Mark McClellan & Douglas Staiger, 1999. "The Quality of Health Care Providers," NBER Working Papers 7327, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Blomqvist, Ake, 1991. "The doctor as double agent: Information asymmetry, health insurance, and medical care," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 411-432.
    5. Schut, Frederik T. & van Doorslaer, Eddy K. A., 1999. "Towards a reinforced agency role of health insurers in Belgium and the Netherlands," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 47-67, July.
    6. Rune J. Sørensen & Jostein Grytten, 1999. "Competition and supplier‐induced demand in a health care system with fixed fees," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 8(6), pages 497-508, September.
    7. Scott, Anthony & Vick, Sandra, 1999. "Patients, Doctors and Contracts: An Application of Principal-Agent Theory to the Doctor-Patient Relationship," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 46(2), pages 111-134, May.
    8. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1994. "The Firm as an Incentive System," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 972-991, September.
    9. Coast, Joanna, 1996. "Appropriateness versus efficiency: the economics of utilisation review," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 69-81, April.
    10. Monrad Aas, I. H., 1995. "Incentives and financing methods," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 205-220, December.
    11. Anthony Scott & Sandra Vick, 1999. "Patients, Doctors and Contracts: An Application of Principal‐Agent Theory to the Doctor‐Patient Relationship," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 46(2), pages 111-134, May.
    12. Paul H. Rubin & Joel L. Schrag, 1999. "Mitigating Agency Problems by Advertising, with Special Reference to Managed Health Care," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 66(1), pages 39-60, July.
    13. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
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    2. Waters, Hugh R. & Hussey, Peter, 2004. "Pricing health services for purchasers--a review of methods and experiences," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 175-184, November.

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