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Costly Nash paths

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  • Kannai, Yakar

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  • Kannai, Yakar, 2003. "Costly Nash paths," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 171-180, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:45:y:2003:i:1:p:171-180
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), 2002. "Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 3, number 3.
    2. Binmore, Ken & Osborne, Martin J. & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1992. "Noncooperative models of bargaining," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 7, pages 179-225, Elsevier.
    3. Yakar Kannai & (*), Emmanuel Tannenbaum, 1998. "Paths leading to the Nash set for nonsmooth games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 27(3), pages 393-405.
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