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Does information disclosure really mitigate information asymmetry among bidders? Evidence from the Chinese land auction market

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  • Lu, Jianxin
  • Xiang, Simeng
  • He, Qian

Abstract

Information disclosure in auctions significantly affects bidder strategies. Using novel manually-collected data on residential land auction participants, we find that while policy-driven disclosure generally promotes strategy optimization and elicits strong reactions from uninformed bidders, informed bidders exhibit no significant behavioral change. Further observing bidders’ heterogeneous responses to an external competition-expectation signal, these results suggest that disclosure has not effectively mitigated information asymmetry among bidders, with the informed retaining a distinct informational advantage.

Suggested Citation

  • Lu, Jianxin & Xiang, Simeng & He, Qian, 2025. "Does information disclosure really mitigate information asymmetry among bidders? Evidence from the Chinese land auction market," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 85(PD).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:finlet:v:85:y:2025:i:pd:s1544612325014084
    DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2025.108153
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    References listed on IDEAS

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