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Fear and greed: The evolution of double liability in American banking, 1865-1930


  • Grossman, Richard S.


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  • Grossman, Richard S., 2007. "Fear and greed: The evolution of double liability in American banking, 1865-1930," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 59-80, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:exehis:v:44:y:2007:i:1:p:59-80

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. McGuire, Robert A., 1981. "Economic Causes of Late-Nineteenth Century Agrarian Unrest:New Evidence," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 41(04), pages 835-852, December.
    2. Davis, Lance E., 1965. "The Investment Market, 1870–1914: The Evolution of a National Market," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 25(03), pages 355-399, September.
    3. Grossman, Richard S, 2001. "Double Liability and Bank Risk Taking," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 33(2), pages 143-159, May.
    4. Frederic S. Mishkin, 1996. "Understanding Financial Crises: A Developing Country Perspective," NBER Working Papers 5600, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Robert G. King & Ross Levine, 1993. "Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might Be Right," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 108(3), pages 717-737.
    6. Ross Levine, 1997. "Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and Agenda," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(2), pages 688-726, June.
    7. Grossman Richard S., 1993. "The Macroeconomic Consequences of Bank Failures under the National Banking System," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 294-320, July.
    8. Arturo Estrella & Anthony P. Rodrigues, 1998. "Consistent covariance matrix estimation in probit models with autocorrelated errors," Staff Reports 39, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    9. Bernanke, Ben S, 1983. "Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in Propagation of the Great Depression," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(3), pages 257-276, June.
    10. Glassman, Cynthia A & Rhoades, Stephen A, 1980. "Owner vs. Manager Control Effects on Bank Performance," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 62(2), pages 263-270, May.
    11. Lebergott, Stanley, 1970. "Migration within the U.S., 1800–1960: Some New Estimates," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 30(04), pages 839-847, December.
    12. Sylla, Richard, 1969. "Federal Policy, Banking Market Structure, and Capital Mobilization in the United States, 1863–1913," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 29(04), pages 657-686, December.
    13. Rajan, Raghuram G. & Zingales, Luigi, 2003. "The great reversals: the politics of financial development in the twentieth century," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 5-50, July.
    14. King, Robert G. & Levine, Ross, 1993. "Finance, entrepreneurship and growth: Theory and evidence," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 513-542, December.
    15. Hyman P. Minsky, 1992. "The Financial Instability Hypothesis," Economics Working Paper Archive wp_74, Levy Economics Institute.
    16. Bordo, Michael D. & Rockoff, Hugh & Redish, Angela, 1994. "The U.S. Banking System From a Northern Exposure: Stability versus Efficiency," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 54(02), pages 325-341, June.
    17. Peltzman, Sam, 1976. "Toward a More General Theory of Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(2), pages 211-240, August.
    18. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
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    Cited by:

    1. Howard Bodenhorn, 2015. "Double Liability at Early American Banks," NBER Working Papers 21494, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Eugene N. White, 2011. ""To Establish a More Effective Supervision of Banking": How the Birth of the Fed Altered Bank Supervision," NBER Working Papers 16825, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Efraim Benmelech & Tobias J. Moskowitz, 2010. "The Political Economy of Financial Regulation: Evidence from U.S. State Usury Laws in the 19th Century," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 65(3), pages 1029-1073, June.
    4. Eugene N. White, 2014. "Lessons from the Great American Real Estate Boom and Bust of the 1920s," NBER Chapters,in: Housing and Mortgage Markets in Historical Perspective, pages 115-158 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Camille Cornand & Céline Gimet, 2011. "The 2007-2008 financial crisis : Is there evidence of disaster myopia ?," Working Papers 1125, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    6. Chu, Kam Hon, 2015. "Bank consolidation and stability: The Canadian experience, 1867–1935," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 21(C), pages 46-60.
    7. Mitchener, Kris James & Richardson, Gary, 2013. "Does “skin in the game” reduce risk taking? Leverage, liability and the long-run consequences of new deal banking reforms," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 508-525.
    8. Salter, Alexander W. & Veetil, Vipin & White, Lawrence H., 2017. "Extended shareholder liability as a means to constrain moral hazard in insured banks," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 153-160.
    9. Richard S. Grossman & Masami Imai, 2011. "Contingent Capital and Bank Risk-Taking among British Banks before World War I," Wesleyan Economics Working Papers 2011-003, Wesleyan University, Department of Economics.

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