IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/enepol/v71y2014icp63-75.html

A Quasi-Feed-In-Tariff policy formulation in micro-grids: A bi-level multi-period approach

Author

Listed:
  • Taha, Ahmad F.
  • Hachem, Nadim A.
  • Panchal, Jitesh H.

Abstract

A Quasi-Feed-In-Tariff (QFIT) policy formulation is presented for micro-grids that integrates renewable energy generation considering Policy Makers׳ and Generation Companies׳ (GENCOs) objectives assuming a bi-level multi-period formulation that integrates physical characteristics of the power-grid. The upper-level problem corresponds to the PM, whereas the lower-level decisions are made by GENCOs. We consider that some GENCOs are green energy producers, while others are black energy producers. Policy makers incentivize green energy producers to generate energy through the payment of optimal time-varying subsidy price. The policy maker׳s main objective is to maximize an overall social welfare that includes factors such as demand surplus, energy cost, renewable energy subsidy price, and environmental standards. The lower-level problem corresponding to the GENCOs is based on maximizing the players׳ profits. The proposed QFIT policy differs from the FIT policy in the sense that the subsidy price-based contracts offered to green energy producers dynamically change over time, depending on the physical properties of the grid, demand, and energy price fluctuations. The integrated problem solves for time-varying subsidy price and equilibrium energy quantities that optimize the system welfare under different grid and system conditions.

Suggested Citation

  • Taha, Ahmad F. & Hachem, Nadim A. & Panchal, Jitesh H., 2014. "A Quasi-Feed-In-Tariff policy formulation in micro-grids: A bi-level multi-period approach," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 63-75.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:enepol:v:71:y:2014:i:c:p:63-75
    DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2014.04.014
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421514002304
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.enpol.2014.04.014?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, December.
    2. Tamás, Mészáros Mátyás & Bade Shrestha, S.O. & Zhou, Huizhong, 2010. "Feed-in tariff and tradable green certificate in oligopoly," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(8), pages 4040-4047, August.
    3. David M. Newbery, 1998. "Competition, Contracts, and Entry in the Electricity Spot Market," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(4), pages 726-749, Winter.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Lacchini, Corrado & Rüther, Ricardo, 2015. "The influence of government strategies on the financial return of capital invested in PV systems located in different climatic zones in Brazil," Renewable Energy, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 786-798.
    2. Zhen, J.L. & Huang, G.H. & Li, W. & Liu, Z.P. & Wu, C.B., 2017. "An inexact optimization model for regional electric system steady operation management considering integrated renewable resources," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 195-209.
    3. Kaur, Amanpreet & Nonnenmacher, Lukas & Coimbra, Carlos F.M., 2016. "Net load forecasting for high renewable energy penetration grids," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 1073-1084.
    4. Nouicer, Athir & Meeus, Leonardo & Delarue, Erik, 2023. "Demand-side flexibility in distribution grids: Voluntary versus mandatory contracting," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 173(C).
    5. Chen, Yizhong & He, Li & Li, Jing & Cheng, Xi & Lu, Hongwei, 2016. "An inexact bi-level simulation–optimization model for conjunctive regional renewable energy planning and air pollution control for electric power generation systems," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 969-983.
    6. Yong Long & Chengrong Pan & Yu Wang, 2018. "Research on a Microgrid Subsidy Strategy Based on Operational Efficiency of the Industry Chain," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 10(5), pages 1-26, May.
    7. Garcez, Catherine Aliana Gucciardi, 2017. "What do we know about the study of distributed generation policies and regulations in the Americas? A systematic review of literature," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 1404-1416.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ying, Zhou & Xin-gang, Zhao & Xue-feng, Jia & Zhen, Wang, 2021. "Can the Renewable Portfolio Standards improve social welfare in China's electricity market？," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 152(C).
    2. Ying, Zhou & Xin-gang, Zhao & Zhen, Wang, 2020. "Demand side incentive under renewable portfolio standards: A system dynamics analysis," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 144(C).
    3. Szabó, György & Borsos, István & Szombati, Edit, 2019. "Games, graphs and Kirchhoff laws," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 521(C), pages 416-423.
    4. Shi, Yi & Deng, Yawen & Wang, Guoan & Xu, Jiuping, 2020. "Stackelberg equilibrium-based eco-economic approach for sustainable development of kitchen waste disposal with subsidy policy: A case study from China," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 196(C).
    5. Newbery, David M. & Greve, Thomas, 2017. "The strategic robustness of oligopoly electricity market models," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 124-132.
    6. Marc Le Menestrel, 2003. "A one-shot Prisoners’ Dilemma with procedural utility," Economics Working Papers 819, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    7. Cheng‐Kuang Wu & Yi‐Ming Chen & Dachrahn Wu & Ching‐Lin Chi, 2020. "A Game Theory Approach for Assessment of Risk and Deployment of Police Patrols in Response to Criminal Activity in San Francisco," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 40(3), pages 534-549, March.
    8. Moreno, William Fernando, 2025. "Modeling Knowledge and Decision-Making with the Conditional Reasoning Framework," OSF Preprints zwpnv_v9, Center for Open Science.
    9. Nasimeh Heydaribeni & Achilleas Anastasopoulos, 2019. "Linear Equilibria for Dynamic LQG Games with Asymmetric Information and Dependent Types," Papers 1909.04834, arXiv.org.
    10. Müller, Christoph, 2020. "Robust implementation in weakly perfect Bayesian strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 189(C).
    11. Neuhoff, Karsten & Barquin, Julian & Boots, Maroeska G. & Ehrenmann, Andreas & Hobbs, Benjamin F. & Rijkers, Fieke A.M. & Vazquez, Miguel, 2005. "Network-constrained Cournot models of liberalized electricity markets: the devil is in the details," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 495-525, May.
    12. Fiuza de Bragança, Gabriel Godofredo & Daglish, Toby, 2016. "Can market power in the electricity spot market translate into market power in the hedge market?," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 11-26.
    13. Bonacina, Monica & Gulli`, Francesco, 2007. "Electricity pricing under "carbon emissions trading": A dominant firm with competitive fringe model," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(8), pages 4200-4220, August.
    14. Dasgupta Utteeyo, 2011. "Are Entry Threats Always Credible?," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-41, December.
    15. Baran Han, 2018. "The role and welfare rationale of secondary sanctions: A theory and a case study of the US sanctions targeting Iran," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 35(5), pages 474-502, September.
    16. Asheim, Geir & Søvik, Ylva, 2003. "The semantics of preference-based belief operators," Memorandum 05/2003, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    17. Salvador Barberà & Anke Gerber, 2024. "On the Endogenous Order of Play in Sequential Games," Working Papers 1443, Barcelona School of Economics.
    18. Wang, Yafeng & Graham, Brett, 2009. "Generalized Maximum Entropy estimation of discrete sequential move games of perfect information," MPRA Paper 21331, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    19. repec:dau:papers:123456789/6818 is not listed on IDEAS
    20. Tobias Harks & Martin Hoefer & Anja Schedel & Manuel Surek, 2021. "Efficient Black-Box Reductions for Separable Cost Sharing," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 46(1), pages 134-158, February.
    21. de Bragança, Gabriel Godofredo Fiuza & Daglish, Toby, 2017. "Investing in vertical integration: electricity retail market participation," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 355-365.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:enepol:v:71:y:2014:i:c:p:63-75. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/enpol .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.