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The welfare impacts of discriminatory price tariffs

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  • Danias, Nikolaos
  • Swales, J. Kim

Abstract

This paper examines the use of asymmetric tariffs as a regulatory instrument. A monopoly setup is adopted in which the firm sells in two markets but price controls are introduced in just one. The regulator's objective is to increase consumer welfare through this price discriminatory practice, with the firm operating under a profit constraint. We consider cases where consumer welfare in the two markets is weighted both equally and unequally and also cases where the cost of supplying the two retail markets is determined in a monopsonistic input market. The results suggest that in certain situations controlling prices in only one market could be a desirable option from a welfare perspective.

Suggested Citation

  • Danias, Nikolaos & Swales, J. Kim, 2018. "The welfare impacts of discriminatory price tariffs," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 321-331.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eneeco:v:71:y:2018:i:c:p:321-331
    DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2018.03.011
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Monopoly; Asymmetric regulation; Tariffs; Welfare;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • I31 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - General Welfare, Well-Being
    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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