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A parallel multi-objective scatter search for optimising incentive contract design in projects

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  • Kerkhove, L.-P.
  • Vanhoucke, M.

Abstract

We present a novel optimisation approach for incentive contract design within a project setting. the structure of the remuneration is one of the key challenges faced by the project owner when (s)he decides to hire a contractor. The proposed technique builds on the recently proposed contract design methodology by Kerkhove and Vanhoucke (Omega, 2015). Specifically, a novel multi-objective scatter search heuristic is proposed and implemented using parallelisation. Both single- and multi-population implementations of this heuristic are compared to the original full-factorial approach as well as commercial optimisation software. The results of the computational experiments indicate that the single-population parallel scatter search procedure significantly outperforms the other solution strategies in terms of both speed and solution quality.

Suggested Citation

  • Kerkhove, L.-P. & Vanhoucke, M., 2017. "A parallel multi-objective scatter search for optimising incentive contract design in projects," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 261(3), pages 1066-1084.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:261:y:2017:i:3:p:1066-1084
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2017.02.043
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    Cited by:

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    2. Wen Jiang & Li Yuan & Lanjun Wu & Shiyue Guo, 2019. "Carbon emission reduction and profit distribution mechanism of construction supply chain with fairness concern and cap-and-trade," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 14(10), pages 1-23, October.
    3. Guangdong Wu, 2017. "A Multi-Objective Trade-Off Model in Sustainable Construction Projects," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 9(11), pages 1-18, October.
    4. Haikun Han & Juqin Shen & Bo Liu & Han Han, 2022. "Dynamic Incentive Mechanism for Large-scale Projects Based on the Reputation Effects," SAGE Open, , vol. 12(4), pages 21582440221, October.
    5. Schryen, Guido, 2020. "Parallel computational optimization in operations research: A new integrative framework, literature review and research directions," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 287(1), pages 1-18.

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