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Arbitration procedures with multiple arbitrators

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  • Mazalov, Vladimir
  • Tokareva, Julia

Abstract

We consider two final-offer arbitration procedures in the case where there is more than one arbitrator. Two players, labeled 1 and 2 and interpreted here as Labor and Management, respectively, are in dispute about an increase in the wage rate. They submit final offers to a Referee. There are N arbitrators. Each of the arbitrators has her own assessment and selects the offer which is closest to her assessment. After that each arbitrator informs the Referee about her decision. The Referee counts the votes and declares the player obtaining the most votes to be the winner. Under the second arbitration scheme, the Referee takes into account only the assessments which lie between the players’ offers. The game is modeled as a zero-sum game. The Nash equilibrium in this arbitration game is derived.

Suggested Citation

  • Mazalov, Vladimir & Tokareva, Julia, 2012. "Arbitration procedures with multiple arbitrators," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 217(1), pages 198-203.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:217:y:2012:i:1:p:198-203 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2011.09.014
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Steven J. Brams & Samuel Merrill, III, 1986. "Binding Versus Final-Offer Arbitration: A Combination is Best," Management Science, INFORMS, pages 1346-1355.
    2. William F. Samuelson, 1991. "Final-Offer Arbitration Under Incomplete Information," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 37(10), pages 1234-1247, October.
    3. Zeng, Dao-Zhi, 2003. "An amendment to final-offer arbitration," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 9-19, August.
    4. Hurley, W. J., 2003. "Effects of multiple arbitrators on final-offer arbitration settlements," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 145(3), pages 660-664, March.
    5. Steven J. Brams & Samuel Merrill, III, 1983. "Equilibrium Strategies for Final-Offer Arbitration: There is no Median Convergence," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 29(8), pages 927-941, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Li, Deng-Feng, 2012. "A fast approach to compute fuzzy values of matrix games with payoffs of triangular fuzzy numbers," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 223(2), pages 421-429.

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