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Fair allocation using a fast smart market auction

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  • Li, Chu-Fen
  • Li, Jung-Shian

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  • Li, Chu-Fen & Li, Jung-Shian, 2006. "Fair allocation using a fast smart market auction," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 172(1), pages 352-365, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:172:y:2006:i:1:p:352-365
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mackie-Mason, J.K. & Varian, H.R., 1993. "Pricing the Internet," Memorandum 1993_020, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    2. Krishna, Vijay, 2009. "Auction Theory," Elsevier Monographs, Elsevier, edition 2, number 9780123745071.
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    Cited by:

    1. Lorenzen, Peter & Alvarez-Bel, Carlos, 2022. "Variable cost evaluation of heating plants in district heating systems considering the temperature impact," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 305(C).

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