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Hierarchical computation of the resource allocation problem

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  • Van Zandt, Timothy

Abstract

Some recent research on information processing in organizations has treated the agents who process information as endogenous. This paper discusses a sample of models in this area, which differ in their methodology but are unifed by the fact that they study the resource allocation problem. Computational constraints are related to the structure and returns to scale of hierarchies.
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Suggested Citation

  • Van Zandt, Timothy, 1995. "Hierarchical computation of the resource allocation problem," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(3-4), pages 700-708, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:39:y:1995:i:3-4:p:700-708
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Patrick Bolton & Mathias Dewatripont, 1994. "The Firm as a Communication Network," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 109(4), pages 809-839.
    2. Timothy Van Zandt, 1997. "Real-Time Hierarchical Resource Allocation," Discussion Papers 1231, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    3. Roy Radner & Timothy Van Zandt, 1992. "Information Processing in Firms and Returns to Scale," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 25-26, pages 265-298.
    4. repec:adr:anecst:y:1992:i:25-26:p:13 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Geanakoplos, John & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "A theory of hierarchies based on limited managerial attention," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 205-225, September.
    6. Michael Keren & David Levhari, 1983. "The Internal Organization of the Firm and the Shape of Average Costs," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 474-486, Autumn.
    7. Michael Keren & David Levhari, 1979. "The Optimum Span of Control in a Pure Hierarchy," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 25(11), pages 1162-1172, November.
    8. Timothy Van Zandt, 1998. "The scheduling and organization of periodic associative computation: Efficient networks," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 3(2), pages 93-127.
    9. Radner, Roy, 1993. "The Organization of Decentralized Information Processing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1109-1146, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Fioretti, Guido, 2008. "Two Lyapunov Functions for Flexible Organizations," MPRA Paper 8204, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Fleischmann, Moritz & Kloos, Konstantin & Nouri, Maryam & Pibernik, Richard, 2020. "Single-period stochastic demand fulfillment in customer hierarchies," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 286(1), pages 250-266.
    3. Anil Arya & Jonathan Glover & Bryan R. Routledge, 2002. "Project Assignment Rights and Incentives for Eliciting Ideas," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 48(7), pages 886-899, July.
    4. Guido Fioretti, 2012. "Two measures of organizational flexibility," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 22(5), pages 957-979, November.
    5. Bolton, Patrick & Dewatripont, Mathias, 1995. "The time and budget constraints of the firm," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(3-4), pages 691-699, April.
    6. Meagher, Kieron & Rogers, Mark, 2004. "Network density and R&D spillovers," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 237-260, February.

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