IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/reecde/v3y1998i2p93-127.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The scheduling and organization of periodic associative computation: Efficient networks

Author

Listed:
  • Timothy Van Zandt

    () (Department of Economics, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544-1021, USA)

Abstract

This paper characterizes the efficient decentralized networks for calculating the associative aggregate of cohorts of data of a fixed size that arrive periodically. Radner (1993) proposed this problem of periodic parallel associative computation as a model of the ongoing information processing and communication by the administrative staff of a large organization. For a simpler model in which the organization processes a single cohort of data - which is equivalent to the periodic model when the agents are paid only when busy - he found that the efficient networks are hierarchical but quite irregular, even though the computation problem and technology are each symmetric. In the periodic model in which managers are paid even when idle, it becomes important to minimize idle time when scheduling managers to processing tasks. Such scheduling appears more difficult when each problem is processed by an irregular hierarchy, which suggest that hierarchies might be more regular in the periodic model. However, we show that in a class of efficient networks for periodic computation that spans the efficiency frontier, the processing of each cohort is similar to the efficient processing of a single cohort, and the overall organizational structure is not even hierarchical.

Suggested Citation

  • Timothy Van Zandt, 1998. "The scheduling and organization of periodic associative computation: Efficient networks," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 3(2), pages 93-127.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1998:i:2:p:93-127
    Note: Received: 15 October 1994 / Accepted: 6 March 1997
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/10058/papers/8003002/80030093.pdf
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted

    File URL: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/10058/papers/8003002/80030093.ps.gz
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Grüner, Hans Peter, 2009. "Information technology: Efficient restructuring and the productivity puzzle," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(3), pages 916-929, December.
    2. Andrea Patacconi, 2009. "Coordination and delay in hierarchies," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(1), pages 190-208.
    3. Grüner, Hans Peter, 2007. "Protocol Design and (De-)Centralization," CEPR Discussion Papers 6357, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Van Zandt, Timothy, 1995. "Hierarchical computation of the resource allocation problem," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(3-4), pages 700-708, April.
    5. Grüner, Hans Peter & Schulte, Elisabeth, 2010. "Speed and quality of collective decision making: Incentives for information provision," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 734-747, December.
    6. Van Zandt, Timothy, 2003. "Real-Time Hierarchical Resource Allocation with Quadratic Costs," CEPR Discussion Papers 4022, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Schulte, Elisabeth & Peter Gruner, Hans, 2007. "Speed and quality of collective decision making: Imperfect information processing," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 138-154, May.
    8. Hans Peter Grüner, 2010. "Speed and Quality of Collective Decision Making: Incentives for Information Provision," Post-Print hal-00911831, HAL.
    9. Hans Peter Grüner & Elisabeth Schulte, 2004. "Speed and Quality of Collective Decision Making: Incentives for," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000417, UCLA Department of Economics.
    10. Eyal Winter, 2001. "Scapegoats and Optimal Allocation of Responsibility," Discussion Paper Series dp266, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    11. Meagher, Kieron J & Orbay, Hakan & Van Zandt, Timothy, 2001. "Hierarchy Size and Environmental Uncertainty," CEPR Discussion Papers 2839, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Orbay, Hakan, 2002. "Information Processing Hierarchies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 370-407, August.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1998:i:2:p:93-127. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.