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Flights towards defection in economic transactions

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  • Perc, Matjaz

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  • Perc, Matjaz, 2007. "Flights towards defection in economic transactions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 97(1), pages 58-63, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:97:y:2007:i:1:p:58-63
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, 2008. "The Folk Theorem In Repeated Games With Discounting Or With Incomplete Information," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 11, pages 209-230, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    2. Moller, Marc, 2005. "Optimal partnership in a repeated prisoner's dilemma," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 13-19, July.
    3. Breitmoser, Yves, 2005. "Infinitely repeated games of reciprocal players," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 89(3), pages 323-327, December.
    4. Perc, Matjaz, 2007. "Erratum to "Microeconomic uncertainties facilitate cooperative alliances and social welfare" [Economics Letters 95 (2007) 104-109]," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 96(2), pages 292-293, August.
    5. Crawford, Vincent P., 2002. "John Nash and the analysis of strategic behavior," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 75(3), pages 377-382, May.
    6. Perc, Matjaz, 2007. "Microeconomic uncertainties facilitate cooperative alliances and social welfare," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 95(1), pages 104-109, April.
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    7. Zhang, Gui-Qing & Hu, Tao-Ping & Yu, Zi, 2016. "An improved fitness evaluation mechanism with noise in prisoner’s dilemma game," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 276(C), pages 31-36.

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