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When half a boycott makes a winner: On Eurovision voting

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  • Frug, Alexander

Abstract

Boycotts are meant to isolate. A pushback — however small — is almost always inevitable. In settings with many alternatives, boycott tends to be diffuse, while counter-support is concentrated. This asymmetry can translate into a great advantage for the boycotted party.

Suggested Citation

  • Frug, Alexander, 2025. "When half a boycott makes a winner: On Eurovision voting," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 256(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:256:y:2025:i:c:s0165176525004768
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112639
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Neureiter, Michael & Bhattacharya, C.B., 2021. "Why do boycotts sometimes increase sales? Consumer activism in the age of political polarization," Business Horizons, Elsevier, vol. 64(5), pages 611-620.
    2. Barton, Jared & Castillo, Marco & Petrie, Ragan, 2016. "Negative campaigning, fundraising, and voter turnout: A field experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 99-113.
    3. Sun, Yeneng, 2006. "The exact law of large numbers via Fubini extension and characterization of insurable risks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 126(1), pages 31-69, January.
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