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Non-parametric tests of output- and cost-sharing games

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  • Banzhaf, H．Spencer
  • Liu, Yaqin

Abstract

The “tragedy of the commons” describes a variety of social dilemmas where total economic surplus is produced jointly from collective behavior and where individuals can strategically manipulate their share of the surplus. Recent research has shown that it is possible to test non-parametrically whether observed behavioral data are consistent with the canonical average return game, in which players share joint output in proportion to their inputs. We show that these tests extend to a much broader range of surplus sharing games. These games include equal-sharing of joint output and weighted averages of equal-sharing and proportionate sharing. They also include the average cost game, in which players share joint costs in proportion to the service provided them.

Suggested Citation

  • Banzhaf, H．Spencer & Liu, Yaqin, 2025. "Non-parametric tests of output- and cost-sharing games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 247(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:247:y:2025:i:c:s0165176525000217
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112184
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Revealed preference; Rationalization; Tragedy of the commons; Common pool resources; Natural resources;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C14 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Semiparametric and Nonparametric Methods: General
    • D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
    • Q30 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - General

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