IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/ecolet/v239y2024ics0165176524002507.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Firing multinational CEOs

Author

Listed:
  • Spencer, Adam Hal

Abstract

This note documents an empirical regularity: CEOs of multinational firms are fired more frequently than those of non-multinationals. Possible mechanisms are explored. Some evidence is found consistent with the two types of firms drawing from different pools of managerial talent, as well as multinationals firing more frequently to protect sunk costs.

Suggested Citation

  • Spencer, Adam Hal, 2024. "Firing multinational CEOs," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 239(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:239:y:2024:i:c:s0165176524002507
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111766
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176524002507
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111766?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    FDI; Multinational firms; Executives; CEOs; Forced turnover;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F10 - International Economics - - Trade - - - General
    • F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:239:y:2024:i:c:s0165176524002507. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.