IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/ecolet/v207y2021ics0165176521003190.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Market shares and profits in two-sided markets

Author

Listed:
  • Sato, Susumu

Abstract

Using a logit demand model of asymmetric oligopoly in two-sided markets, I analyze the relationship between the market shares of platforms and their profits. In line with previous studies, I show that large market shares do not necessarily imply high profits. Decomposing a platform’s market shares on two sides of markets into the size (i.e., the sum of shares) and the structure (i.e., the ratio between shares), I find that, conditional on the size, profits are U-shaped in structure, and that, conditional on the structure, size is positively related to profits. This implies that the change in the structure on the two sides is critical to the understanding of the non-monotonic relationship between market shares and profits and that overall size can still be used as an indicator of the profitability of platforms as long as the structure is controlled.

Suggested Citation

  • Sato, Susumu, 2021. "Market shares and profits in two-sided markets," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:207:y:2021:i:c:s0165176521003190
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110042
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176521003190
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110042?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Belleflamme, Paul & Peitz, Martin & Toulemonde, Eric, 2020. "The tension between market shares and profit under platform competition," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2020027, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    2. Volker Nocke & Nicolas Schutz, 2018. "An Aggregative Games Approach to Merger Analysis in Multiproduct-Firm Oligopoly," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2018_024, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    3. Belleflamme, Paul & Peitz, Martin & Toulemonde, Eric, 2022. "The tension between market shares and profit under platform competition," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
    4. Volker Nocke & Nicolas Schutz, 2018. "Multiproduct‐Firm Oligopoly: An Aggregative Games Approach," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 86(2), pages 523-557, March.
    5. Nocke, Volker & Schutz, Nicolas, 2018. "An Aggregative Games Approach to Merger Analysis in Multiproduct-Firm Oligopoly," CEPR Discussion Papers 12905, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Simon P. Anderson & Nisvan Erkal & Daniel Piccinin, 2020. "Aggregative games and oligopoly theory: short‐run and long‐run analysis," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(2), pages 470-495, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Belleflamme, Paul & Peitz, Martin & Toulemonde, Eric, 2022. "The tension between market shares and profit under platform competition," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Jullien, Bruno & Pavan, Alessandro & Rysman, Marc, 2021. "Two-sided Markets, Pricing, and Network Effects," TSE Working Papers 21-1238, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    2. Nisvan Erkal & Lijun Pan, 2022. "Horizontal Merger Analysis with Endogenous Product Range Choice," ISER Discussion Paper 1162, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    3. Spiegel, Yossi, 2019. "The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and the distribution of social surplus," CEPR Discussion Papers 13925, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/6q707l4svn8k3bt630nhgdqgdu is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Michele Fioretti & Jorge Tamayo, 2021. "Saving for a Dry Day: Coal, Dams, and the Energy Transition," Working Papers hal-03389152, HAL.
    6. Kojun Hamada & Takao Ohkawa & Makoto Okamura, 2022. "Optimal taxation in a free‐entry Cournot oligopoly: The average cost function approach," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 55(2), pages 1166-1192, May.
    7. Gábor Koltay & Szabolcs Lorincz & Tommaso Valletti, 2023. "Concentration and Competition: Evidence From Europe and Implications For Policy1," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 19(3), pages 466-501.
    8. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/6q707l4svn8k3bt630nhgdqgdu is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Justin P. Johnson & Andrew Rhodes, 2021. "Multiproduct mergers and quality competition," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 52(3), pages 633-661, September.
    10. Etro, Federico, 2023. "Platform competition with free entry of sellers," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 89(C).
    11. Vanessa Alviarez & Keith Head & Thierry Mayer, 2020. "Global giants and local stars: How changes in brand ownership affect competition," Working Papers 2020-13, CEPII research center.
    12. Wang, X. Henry & Zhao, Jingang, 2022. "Merger effects in asymmetric and differentiated Bertrand oligopolies," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 37-49.
    13. Takanori ADACHI & Michal Fabinger, 2021. "Pass-Through and the Welfare Effects of Taxation under Imperfect Competition: A General Analysis," Discussion papers e-21-003, Graduate School of Economics , Kyoto University.
    14. Holger Breinich & Harald Fadinger & Volker Nocke & Nicolas Schutz, 2020. "Gravity With Granularity," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2020_236, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    15. Tommaso Valletti & Hans Zenger, 2021. "Mergers with Differentiated Products: Where Do We Stand?," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 58(1), pages 179-212, February.
    16. Alfaro, Martin & Lander, David, 2021. "Restricting entry without aggressive pricing," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(4), pages 305-319.
    17. Motta, Massimo & Tarantino, Emanuele, 2021. "The effect of horizontal mergers, when firms compete in prices and investments," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    18. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/1qif9fqehq930ovnr511k1el4f is not listed on IDEAS
    19. Garcia, Arturo & Leal, Mariel & Lee, Sang-Ho, 2020. "Merger incentive and strategic CSR by a multiproduct corporation," MPRA Paper 98830, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    20. José Luis Moraga‐González & Evgenia Motchenkova & Saish Nevrekar, 2022. "Mergers and innovation portfolios," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 53(4), pages 641-677, December.
    21. Yossi Spiegel, 2021. "The Herfindahl‐Hirschman Index and the Distribution of Social Surplus," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(3), pages 561-594, September.
    22. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/1qif9fqehq930ovnr511k1el4f is not listed on IDEAS
    23. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/6q707l4svn8k3bt630nhgdqgdu is not listed on IDEAS
    24. Simon P. Anderson & Nisvan Erkal & Daniel Piccinin, 2020. "Aggregative games and oligopoly theory: short‐run and long‐run analysis," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(2), pages 470-495, June.
    25. Sébastien Jean & Ariell Reshef & Gianluca Santoni & Vincent Vicard, 2023. "Dominance on World Markets: the China Conundrum," CEPII Policy Brief 2023-44, CEPII research center.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Market share; Market power; Two-sided markets;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:207:y:2021:i:c:s0165176521003190. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.