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A note on perfect correlated equilibria

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  • Liu, Heng
  • Ghosh, Gagan

Abstract

This note studies perfect correlated equilibrium introduced by Dhillon and Mertens (1996). We show that the standard revelation principle for perfect correlated equilibrium distributions holds in two-by-two games. We then show that in N-player two-action games, although the revelation principle fails, a canonical correlated device for any perfect correlated equilibrium distribution involves two copies of action sets as the message space.

Suggested Citation

  • Liu, Heng & Ghosh, Gagan, 2020. "A note on perfect correlated equilibria," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:187:y:2020:i:c:s0165176519304719
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108928
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Shurojit Chatterji & Srihari Govindan, 2006. "Message spaces for perfect correlated equilibria," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 28(2), pages 475-479, June.
    2. Aumann, Robert J., 1974. "Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 67-96, March.
    3. Dhillon, Amrita & Mertens, Jean Francois, 1996. "Perfect Correlated Equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 279-302, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Luo, Xiao & Qiao, Yongchuan & Sun, Yang, 2022. "A revelation principle for correlated equilibrium under trembling-hand perfection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).

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