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How partisan voters fuel the influence of public information

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  • Ferrari, Luca

Abstract

I study sincere voting equilibria in elections with public information in a large Poisson game. In addition to rational voters, the electorate is characterized by the presence of partisan voters who vote according to their ideological position. I show that the set of public signals compatible with sincere voting becomes smaller as the number of partisan voters vanishes which suggests that, when the number of partisan voters is small, public information hardly manipulates voting decisions.

Suggested Citation

  • Ferrari, Luca, 2016. "How partisan voters fuel the influence of public information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 157-160.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:149:y:2016:i:c:p:157-160 DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.10.041
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. repec:cup:apsrev:v:90:y:1996:i:01:p:34-45_20 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Goertz, Johanna M.M. & Maniquet, François, 2011. "On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 1464-1480.
    3. Emir Kamenica & Matthew Gentzkow, 2011. "Bayesian Persuasion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 2590-2615.
    4. Myerson, Roger B., 1998. "Extended Poisson Games and the Condorcet Jury Theorem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 111-131, October.
    5. Ricardo Alonso & Odilon Câmara, 2016. "Persuading Voters," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(11), pages 3590-3605, November.
    6. Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1997. "Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections with Private Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(5), pages 1029-1058, September.
    7. Myerson, Roger B., 2000. "Large Poisson Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 94(1), pages 7-45, September.
    8. Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 2011. "Overcoming Ideological Bias in Elections," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 119(2), pages 183-211.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ginzburg, Boris, 2017. "Sincere voting in an electorate with heterogeneous preferences," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 120-123.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Strategic voting; Large Poisson games; Public information; Partisan voters;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D89 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Other

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