Insurance in vertically differentiated repair markets
In vertically differentiated repair markets with insured customers, insurance coverage increases price level, entry, and the high quality provider’s profits. In the market for pharmaceuticals, this should be taken into account when calculating the extent of patent periods.
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- Nina Pavcnik, 2002. "Do Pharmaceutical Prices Respond to Potential Patient Out-of-Pocket Expenses?," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(3), pages 469-487, Autumn.
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- Amy Finkelstein, 2007. "The Aggregate Effects of Health Insurance: Evidence from the Introduction of Medicare," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 122(1), pages 1-37.
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