The first-order approach in rank-order tournaments
The first-order approach in rank-order tournaments is addressed. It is demonstrated that the conditions given in the literature are not sufficient to guarantee concavity of agents' objective functions. Additional conditions are provided that ensure validity of the first-order approach.
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"Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts,"
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