Price sensitive prescribers
When prescribers are not price sensitive, prescriptions segment the duopoly market and the unique dominant strategy equilibrium has both firms setting the monopoly price. When some prescribers are price sensitive, manufacturers use mixed strategies but still earn positive expected profit.
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- Frank Windmeijer & Eric de Laat & Rudy Douven & Esther Mot, 2006.
"Pharmaceutical promotion and GP prescription behaviour,"
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 15(1), pages 5-18.
- Eric de Laat & Rudy Douven & Esther Mot & F. Windmeijer, 2004. "Pharmaceutical promotion and GP prescription behaviour," CPB Discussion Paper 30, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
- Ernst R. Berndt, 2002. "Pharmaceuticals in U.S. Health Care: Determinants of Quantity and Price," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(4), pages 45-66, Fall.
- Toshiaki Iizuka, 2007. "Experts' agency problems: evidence from the prescription drug market in Japan," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(3), pages 844-862, 09. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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