Can health insurance coverage explain the generic competition paradox?
In the context of a three-stage model with consumers differing in their health insurance coverage, the paper shows that there exist conditions under which the price of brand-name drugs increases following the entry of generic drugs.
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- Richard G. Frank & David S. Salkever, 1997.
"Generic Entry and the Pricing of Pharmaceuticals,"
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(1), pages 75-90, 03.
- Richard G. Frank & David S. Salkever, 1995. "Generic Entry and the Pricing of Pharmaceuticals," NBER Working Papers 5306, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Nina Pavcnik, 2002. "Do Pharmaceutical Prices Respond to Potential Patient Out-of-Pocket Expenses?," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(3), pages 469-487, Autumn.
- Grabowski, Henry G & Vernon, John M, 1992. "Brand Loyalty, Entry, and Price Competition in Pharmaceuticals after the 1984 Drug Act," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(2), pages 331-350, October.
- F. M. Scherer, 1993. "Pricing, Profits, and Technological Progress in the Pharmaceutical Industry," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(3), pages 97-115, Summer. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)