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The biodiversity conservation game with heterogeneous countries

Listed author(s):
  • Winands, Sarah
  • Holm-Müller, Karin
  • Weikard, Hans-Peter

Biodiversity is an essential resource, which we classify as conditionally-renewable. In order to achieve conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity virtually all nation states signed the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity. In this paper we investigate how the heterogeneity of countries in regard to ecosystems and wealth influences the stability of international biodiversity conservation agreements both without and with transfers. We further examine the effect of different degrees of ecosystem substitutability. We model a coalition formation game with players that have a continuous conservation choice. The conservation benefit is dependent on wealth and ecosystem quality. Aggregation of global benefits respects differences in ecosystem substitutability. In case of transfers, a fund redistributes coalition benefits according to a sharing rule. The main finding is that in the absence of transfers, compared to the homogeneous situation, heterogeneity in ecosystems and wealth reduces the size of a stable coalition. The destabilising effect is stronger the higher the ecosystem substitutability. Optimal transfers facilitate a large stable coalition.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0921800913000335
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Ecological Economics.

Volume (Year): 89 (2013)
Issue (Month): C ()
Pages: 14-23

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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:89:y:2013:i:c:p:14-23
DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2013.01.013
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolecon

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  1. Rupert Gatti & Timo Goeschl & Ben Groom & Timothy Swanson, 2011. "The Biodiversity Bargaining Problem," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 48(4), pages 609-628, April.
  2. Rosendal, G. Kristin & Andresen, Steinar, 2011. "Institutional design for improved forest governance through REDD: Lessons from the global environment facility," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(11), pages 1908-1915, September.
  3. Gowdy, John M. & Mayumi, Kozo, 2001. "Reformulating the foundations of consumer choice theory and environmental valuation," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 223-237, November.
  4. Hans-Peter Weikard, 2009. "Cartel Stability Under An Optimal Sharing Rule," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 77(5), pages 575-593, September.
  5. Scott Barrett, 1994. "The biodiversity supergame," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 4(1), pages 111-122, February.
  6. Lavoie, Marc, 2004. "Post Keynesian consumer theory: Potential synergies with consumer research and economic psychology," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 639-649, October.
  7. Susanne Droege & Birgit Soete, 2001. "Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights, North-South Trade, and Biological Diversity," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 19(2), pages 149-163, June.
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