IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/ecolec/v65y2008i4p776-787.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The CAMPFIRE programme in Zimbabwe: Payments for wildlife services

Author

Listed:
  • Frost, Peter G.H.
  • Bond, Ivan

Abstract

Payments for environmental services (PES) have been distinguished from the more common integrated conservation and development projects on the grounds that PES are direct, more cost-effective, less complex institutionally, and therefore more likely to produce the desired results. Both kinds of schemes aim to achieve similar conservation outcomes, however, and generally function in analogous social, political and economic environments. Given the relative novelty of PES, what lessons can be learnt and applied from earlier initiatives? In this paper, we describe the evolution over the first 12Â years (1989-2001) of Zimbabwe's Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE), a community-based natural resource management programme in which Rural District Councils, on behalf of communities on communal land, are granted the authority to market access to wildlife in their district to safari operators. These in turn sell hunting and photographic safaris to mostly foreign sport hunters and eco-tourists. The District Councils pay the communities a dividend according to an agreed formula. In practice, there have been some underpayments and frequent delays. During 1989-2001, CAMPFIRE generated over US$20 million of transfers to the participating communities, 89% of which came from sport hunting. The scale of benefits varied greatly across districts, wards and households. Twelve of the 37 districts with authority to market wildlife produced 97% of all CAMPFIRE revenues, reflecting the variability in wildlife resources and local institutional arrangements. The programme has been widely emulated in southern and eastern Africa. We suggest five main lessons for emerging PES schemes: community-level commercial transactions can seldom be pursued in isolation; non-differentiated payments weaken incentives; start-up costs can be high and may need to be underwritten; competitive bidding can allow service providers to hold on to rents; and schemes must be flexible and adaptive.

Suggested Citation

  • Frost, Peter G.H. & Bond, Ivan, 2008. "The CAMPFIRE programme in Zimbabwe: Payments for wildlife services," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(4), pages 776-787, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:65:y:2008:i:4:p:776-787
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0921-8009(07)00498-3
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. G. D. Garrod & K. G. Willis, 1995. "Valuing The Benefits Of The South Downs Environmentally Sensitive Area," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(2), pages 160-173.
    2. Martin Whitby, 2000. "Challenges and Options for the UK Agri-Environment: Presidential Address," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(3), pages 317-332.
    3. L. Harrison-Mayfield & J. Dwyer & G. Brookes, 1998. "The Socio-Economic Effects of the Countryside Stewardship Scheme," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(2), pages 157-170.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Wunder, Sven, 2015. "Revisiting the concept of payments for environmental services," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 234-243.
    2. Clot, Sophie & Andriamahefazafy, Fano & Grolleau, Gilles & Ibanez, Lisette & Méral, Philippe, 2015. "Compensation and Rewards for Environmental Services (CRES) and efficient design of contracts in developing countries. Behavioral insights from a natural field experiment," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 85-96.
    3. Song, Conghe & Zhang, Yulong & Mei, Ying & Liu, Hua & Zhang, Zhiqiang & Zhang, Quanfa & Zha, Tonggang & Zhang, Kerong & Huang, Chenglin & Xu, Xiaoniu & Jagger, Pamela & Chen, Xiaodong & Bilsborrow, Ri, 2014. "Sustainability of Forests Created by China's Sloping Land Conversion Program: A comparison among three sites in Anhui, Hubei and Shanxi," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 161-167.
    4. Coria, Jessica & Calfucura, Enrique, 2012. "Ecotourism and the development of indigenous communities: The good, the bad, and the ugly," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 47-55.
    5. repec:eee:forpol:v:80:y:2017:i:c:p:141-149 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Ross, Cody T., 2016. "Sliding-scale environmental service payments and non-financial incentives: Results of a survey of landowner interest in Costa Rica," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 252-262.
    7. Wunder, Sven & Engel, Stefanie & Pagiola, Stefano, 2008. "Taking stock: A comparative analysis of payments for environmental services programs in developed and developing countries," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(4), pages 834-852, May.
    8. Cranford, Matthew & Mourato, Susana, 2011. "Community conservation and a two-stage approach to payments for ecosystem services," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 89-98.
    9. repec:raf:wpaper:b16863 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Pushpam Kumar & Ibrahim Thiaw (ed.), 2013. "Values, Payments and Institutions for Ecosystem Management," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 15127, April.
    11. Gómez-Baggethun, Erik & de Groot, Rudolf & Lomas, Pedro L. & Montes, Carlos, 2010. "The history of ecosystem services in economic theory and practice: From early notions to markets and payment schemes," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(6), pages 1209-1218, April.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:65:y:2008:i:4:p:776-787. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolecon .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.