IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/ecmode/v36y2014icp502-510.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Benchmarking an optimal pattern of pollution trading: The case of Cub River, Utah

Author

Listed:
  • Caplan, Arthur J.
  • Sasaki, Yuya

Abstract

This paper employs a recently developed, dynamic trading algorithm to establish a benchmark pattern of trade for a potential water quality trading (WQT) market in the Cub River sub-basin of Utah; a market that would ultimately include both point and nonpoint sources. The algorithm accounts for three complications that naturally arise in trading scenarios: (1) combinatorial matching of traders, (2) trader heterogeneity, and (3) discreteness in abatement technology. The algorithm establishes as detailed a reduced-cost benchmark as possible for the sub-basin by distinguishing a specific pattern of trade among would-be market participants. As such, the algorithm provides a benchmark against which an actual pollution market's performance could conceivably be compared. We find that a benchmarked trading pattern for a potential Cub River WQT market – where each source, point or nonpoint, would be required to reduce its pollution loadings – may entail some point sources selling abatement credits to nonpoint sources.

Suggested Citation

  • Caplan, Arthur J. & Sasaki, Yuya, 2014. "Benchmarking an optimal pattern of pollution trading: The case of Cub River, Utah," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 502-510.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:36:y:2014:i:c:p:502-510
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2013.09.026
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0264999313003866
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.econmod.2013.09.026?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Montgomery, W. David, 1972. "Markets in licenses and efficient pollution control programs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 395-418, December.
    2. Kling, Catherine L., 1994. "Environmental benefits from marketable discharge permits or an ecological vs. economical perspective on marketable permits," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 57-64, September.
    3. Dallas Burtraw, 1996. "The So2 Emissions Trading Program: Cost Savings Without Allowance Trades," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 14(2), pages 79-94, April.
    4. Dana L. Hoag & Jennie S. Hughes-Popp, 1997. "Theory and Practice of Pollution Credit Trading in Water Quality Management," Review of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 19(2), pages 252-262.
    5. Atkinson, Scott E. & Lewis, Donald H., 1974. "A cost-effectiveness analysis of alternative air quality control strategies," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 1(3), pages 237-250, November.
    6. O'Ryan, Raul E., 1996. "Cost-Effective Policies to Improve Urban Air Quality in Santiago, Chile," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 302-313, November.
    7. Seskin, Eugene P. & Anderson, Robert Jr. & Reid, Robert O., 1983. "An empirical analysis of economic strategies for controlling air pollution," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 112-124, June.
    8. A. Myrick Freeman III, 2002. "Environmental Policy Since Earth Day I: What Have We Gained?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 125-146, Winter.
    9. King, Dennis M., 2005. "Crunch Time for Water Quality Trading," Choices: The Magazine of Food, Farm, and Resource Issues, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 20(1), pages 1-5.
    10. McGartland, Albert M. & Oates, Wallace E., 1985. "Marketable permits for the prevention of environmental deterioration," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 207-228, September.
    11. Kling, Catherine L., 1994. "Environmental Benefits from Marketable Discharge Permits or an Ecological vs. An Economical View of Marketable Permits," Staff General Research Papers Archive 1605, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    12. Yuya Sasaki & Arthur Caplan, 2008. "Matching Heterogeneous Traders in Quantity-Regulated Markets," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 31(4), pages 341-362, May.
    13. Arthur Caplan, 2008. "Incremental and Average Control Costs in a Model of Water Quality Trading with Discrete Abatement Units," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 41(3), pages 419-435, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Arthur J. Caplan & Yuya Sasaki, 2009. "Matching Traders in a Pollution Market: The Case of Cub River, Utah," Working Papers 2009-08, Utah State University, Department of Economics.
    2. Yuya Sasaki & Arthur Caplan, 2008. "Matching Heterogeneous Traders in Quantity-Regulated Markets," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 31(4), pages 341-362, May.
    3. Cropper, Maureen L & Oates, Wallace E, 1992. "Environmental Economics: A Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 30(2), pages 675-740, June.
    4. Raúl O'Ryan & José Miguel Sánchez, 2002. "Comparing the Net Benefits of Incentive Based and Command and Control Regulations in a Developing Context: the Case of Santiago, Chile," Documentos de Trabajo 221, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
    5. Raúl O'Ryan, 2002. "Factors that Determine the Efficiency Ranking of Second-Best Instruments for Environmental Regulation," Documentos de Trabajo 147, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
    6. Mardones, Cristian, 2024. "Measuring the efficiency gains of merging carbon markets – A microsimulation for thermoelectric and industrial sources," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 290(C).
    7. Kuwayama, Yusuke & Brozović, Nicholas, 2013. "The regulation of a spatially heterogeneous externality: Tradable groundwater permits to protect streams," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 364-382.
    8. Chao-Ning Liao, 2009. "Technology adoption decisions under a mixed regulatory system of tradable permits and air pollution fees for the control of Total Suspended Particulates in Taiwan," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 35(2), pages 135-153, April.
    9. Newell, Richard G & Stavins, Robert N, 2003. "Cost Heterogeneity and the Potential Savings from Market-Based Policies," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 43-59, January.
    10. Boisvert, Richard N. & Poe, Gregory L. & Sado, Yukako, 2007. "Selected Economic Aspects of Water Quality Trading: A Primer and Interpretive Literature Review," EB Series 121835, Cornell University, Department of Applied Economics and Management.
    11. Stavins, Robert & Newell, Richard, 2000. "Abatement-Cost Heterogeneity and Anticipated Savings from Market-Based Environmental Policies," Working Paper Series rwp00-006, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    12. Revesz, Richard & Stavins, Robert, 2004. "Environmental Law and Policy," Working Paper Series rwp04-023, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    13. Morgan, Cynthia L. & Coggins, Jay S. & Eidman, Vernon R., 2000. "Tradable Permits For Controlling Nitrates In Groundwater At The Farm Level: A Conceptual Model," Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, Southern Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 32(2), pages 1-10, August.
    14. Fullerton, Don & Metcalf, Gilbert E., 2002. "Cap and trade policies in the presence of monopoly and distortionary taxation," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 327-347, November.
    15. Randall, Alan & Taylor, Michael A., 2000. "Incentive-Based Solutions To Agricultural Environmental Problems: Recent Developments In Theory And Practice," Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, Southern Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 32(2), pages 1-14, August.
    16. Zhao, Tianli & Poe, Gregory L. & Boisvert, Richard N., 2015. "Management Areas and Fixed Costs in the Economics of Water Quality Trading," Working Papers 250017, Cornell University, Department of Applied Economics and Management.
    17. Antonio M. Bento & Emeric Henry & Scott E. Lowe, 2013. "The Determinants of Credit Allocations in a Market-based Trading System: Evidence from the RECLAIM Program," The Review of Regional Studies, Southern Regional Science Association, vol. 43(1), pages 51-80, Summer.
    18. Tom Tietenberg, 1995. "Tradeable permits for pollution control when emission location matters: What have we learned?," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 5(2), pages 95-113, March.
    19. Winebrake, James J. & Farrell, Alexander E. & Bernstein, Mark A., 1995. "The clean air act's sulfur dioxide emissions market: Estimating the costs of regulatory and legislative intervention," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 239-260, November.
    20. Zhao, Tianli & Sado, Yukako & Boisvert, Richard N. & Poe, Gregory L., 2009. "“Open Markets” v. “Structured Bilateral Trades”: Results of Economic Modeling of Point-to-Point Source Water Quality Trading in the Non-Tidal Passaic River Basin," 2009 Annual Meeting, July 26-28, 2009, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 49509, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Advancement algorithm; Retreat algorithm; Water quality trading;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q24 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Land
    • Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water
    • Q19 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Other

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:36:y:2014:i:c:p:502-510. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/30411 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.