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Dynamics of Multi-Stage Screening

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  • Lagziel, David
  • Lehrer, Ehud

Abstract

This study explores dynamic screening problems in which elements undergo noisy evaluations. Some elements are discarded at each stage, while the remainder are re-evaluated independently in subsequent stages. We demonstrate that, ceteris paribus, the quality of a screening process may not improve as the number of stages increases. Specifically, we examine the resulting elements’ values and demonstrate that adding a single stage to a screening process may produce inferior results in terms of stochastic dominance, while increasing the number of stages substantially leads to a first-best outcome.

Suggested Citation

  • Lagziel, David & Lehrer, Ehud, 2025. "Dynamics of Multi-Stage Screening," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 151(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:151:y:2025:i:c:s0264999325001993
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2025.107204
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • D49 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Other
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

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