IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/deveco/v139y2019icp50-68.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The political economy of land reform enactments: New cross-national evidence (1900–2010)

Author

Listed:
  • Bhattacharya, Prasad S.
  • Mitra, Devashish
  • Ulubaşoğlu, Mehmet A.

Abstract

We construct a unique, extensive dataset that codifies 372 major land reform enactments in 165 countries during the period 1900–2010 and classifies them as those with several different motives. Exploiting the geographic and time variation in land reforms and political transitions across the globe over more than a century, we find that democratic transitions are linked with a greater likelihood of land reforms of the pro-poor type as well as those with different inequality-reducing motives. These results are robust to adding important controls, changing variable definitions, using alternative data, addressing endogeneity to the extent possible, and moving from enactments to implementations. We also estimate a positive impact of autocratic transitions on pro-poor and some inequality-reducing land reforms, but these results emerge mainly with instrumental-variables estimation. We also show that a leftward shift in the political ideology of the chief executive is associated with a higher likelihood of pro-poor land reforms as well as a few types of inequality-reducing ones.

Suggested Citation

  • Bhattacharya, Prasad S. & Mitra, Devashish & Ulubaşoğlu, Mehmet A., 2019. "The political economy of land reform enactments: New cross-national evidence (1900–2010)," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 50-68.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:deveco:v:139:y:2019:i:c:p:50-68
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2019.01.007
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304387818304553
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2019.01.007?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Keswell, Malcolm & Carter, Michael R., 2014. "Poverty and land redistribution," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 250-261.
    2. Chernina, Eugenia & Castañeda Dower, Paul & Markevich, Andrei, 2014. "Property rights, land liquidity, and internal migration," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 191-215.
    3. de Janvry, Alain & Gonzalez-Navarro, Marco & Sadoulet, Elisabeth, 2014. "Are land reforms granting complete property rights politically risky? Electoral outcomes of Mexico's certification program," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 216-225.
    4. Klaus Deininger, 2003. "Land Policies for Growth and Poverty Reduction," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 15125, December.
    5. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2001. "A Theory of Political Transitions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(4), pages 938-963, September.
    6. Alberto Alesina & Dani Rodrik, 1994. "Distributive Politics and Economic Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 109(2), pages 465-490.
    7. Rosenzweig, Mark R & Binswanger, Hans P, 1993. "Wealth, Weather Risk and the Composition and Profitability of Agricultural Investments," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 103(416), pages 56-78, January.
    8. Abhijit Banerjee & Lakshmi Iyer, 2005. "History, Institutions, and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 1190-1213, September.
    9. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2008. "Persistence of Power, Elites, and Institutions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(1), pages 267-293, March.
    10. Timothy Besley & Robin Burgess, 2000. "Land Reform, Poverty Reduction, and Growth: Evidence from India," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 115(2), pages 389-430.
    11. Oded Galor & Omer Moav & Dietrich Vollrath, 2009. "Inequality in Landownership, the Emergence of Human-Capital Promoting Institutions, and the Great Divergence," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 76(1), pages 143-179.
    12. Bardhan, Pranab & Luca, Michael & Mookherjee, Dilip & Pino, Francisco, 2014. "Evolution of land distribution in West Bengal 1967–2004: Role of land reform and demographic changes," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 171-190.
    13. Binswanger, Hans P. & Deininger, Klaus & Feder, Gershon, 1995. "Power, distortions, revolt and reform in agricultural land relations," Handbook of Development Economics, in: Hollis Chenery & T.N. Srinivasan (ed.), Handbook of Development Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 42, pages 2659-2772, Elsevier.
    14. Acemoglu,Daron & Robinson,James A., 2009. "Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521671422, November.
    15. Benjamin F. Jones & Benjamin A. Olken, 2005. "Do Leaders Matter? National Leadership and Growth Since World War II," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 120(3), pages 835-864.
    16. Abhijit V. Banerjee & Paul J. Gertler & Maitreesh Ghatak, 2002. "Empowerment and Efficiency: Tenancy Reform in West Bengal," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(2), pages 239-280, April.
    17. José Cheibub & Jennifer Gandhi & James Vreeland, 2010. "Democracy and dictatorship revisited," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 143(1), pages 67-101, April.
    18. Horowitz, Andrew W, 1993. "Time Paths of Land Reform: A Theoretical Model of Reform Dynamics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(4), pages 1003-1010, September.
    19. Alain de Janvry & Kyle Emerick & Marco Gonzalez-Navarro & Elisabeth Sadoulet, 2015. "Delinking Land Rights from Land Use: Certification and Migration in Mexico," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(10), pages 3125-3149, October.
    20. Bardhan, Pranab K, 1973. "Size, Productivity, and Returns to Scale: An Analysis of Farm-Level Data in Indian Agriculture," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(6), pages 1370-1386, Nov.-Dec..
    21. Albertus, Michael & Menaldo, Victor, 2014. "Gaming Democracy: Elite Dominance during Transition and the Prospects for Redistribution," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 44(3), pages 575-603, July.
    22. Albertus,Michael, 2015. "Autocracy and Redistribution," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107514300, November.
    23. Pranab Bardhan & Dilip Mookherjee, 2010. "Determinants of Redistributive Politics: An Empirical Analysis of Land Reforms in West Bengal, India," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(4), pages 1572-1600, September.
    24. Besley, Timothy, 1995. "Property Rights and Investment Incentives: Theory and Evidence from Ghana," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(5), pages 903-937, October.
    25. Albertus,Michael, 2015. "Autocracy and Redistribution," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107106550, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Jomoor, Erfan Rezapour & Rostami, Farahnaz & Geravandi, Shahpar, 2023. "How have the land reform, misunderstanding, and dysfunction of modernity led to rural underdevelopment in Iran?," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 131(C).
    2. Coral, Claudia & Bokelmann, Wolfgang & Bonatti, Michelle & Carcamo, Robert & Sieber, Stefan, 2021. "Understanding institutional change mechanisms for land use: Lessons from Ecuador’s history," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 108(C).
    3. Casaburi, Lorenzo & Caprettini, Bruno & Venturini, Miriam, 2021. "Redistribution, Voting and Clientelism: Evidence from the Italian Land Reform," CEPR Discussion Papers 15679, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Albertus, Michael & Espinoza, Mauricio & Fort, Ricardo, 2020. "Land reform and human capital development: Evidence from Peru," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 147(C).
    5. Juan David Torres, 2022. "Shaping inequality? Property rights, landed elites and public lands in Colombia," Documentos CEDE 20514, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
    6. Bhattacharya, Prasad Sankar & Chowdhury, Prabal Roy & Rahman, Habibur, 2023. "Does credit availability mitigate domestic conflict?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 119(C).
    7. Boberg-Fazlić, Nina & Lampe, Markus & Martinelli Lasheras, Pablo & Sharp, Paul, 2022. "Winners and losers from agrarian reform: Evidence from Danish land inequality 1682–1895," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 155(C).
    8. Hossein Azadi & Eric Vanhaute, 2019. "Mutual Effects of Land Distribution and Economic Development: Evidence from Asia, Africa, and Latin America," Land, MDPI, vol. 8(6), pages 1-15, June.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Albertus, Michael & Espinoza, Mauricio & Fort, Ricardo, 2020. "Land reform and human capital development: Evidence from Peru," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 147(C).
    2. Faguet, Jean-Paul & Sánchez, Fabio & Villaveces, Marta-Juanita, 2020. "The perversion of public land distribution by landed elites: Power, inequality and development in Colombia," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 136(C).
    3. Boberg-Fazlić, Nina & Lampe, Markus & Martinelli Lasheras, Pablo & Sharp, Paul, 2022. "Winners and losers from agrarian reform: Evidence from Danish land inequality 1682–1895," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 155(C).
    4. Benson, Allison L., 2021. "From targeted private benefits to public goods: Land, distributive politics and changing political conditions in Colombia," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 146(C).
    5. Besley, Timothy & Leight, Jessica & Pande, Rohini & Rao, Vijayendra, 2016. "Long-run impacts of land regulation: Evidence from tenancy reform in India," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 72-87.
    6. Michael Albertus & Victor Gay, 2017. "Unlikely Democrats: Economic Elite Uncertainty under Dictatorship and Support for Democratization," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 61(3), pages 624-641, July.
    7. Conning, Jonathan H. & Robinson, James A., 2007. "Property rights and the political organization of agriculture," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 416-447, March.
    8. Chaoran Chen & Diego Restuccia & Raul Santaeulalia-Llopis, 2022. "The Effects of Land Markets on Resource Allocation and Agricultural Productivity," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 45, pages 41-54, July.
    9. Klaus W. Deininger & Songqing Jin & Vandana Yadav, 2011. "Long-term Effects of Land Reform on Human Capital Accumulation: Evidence from West Bengal," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2011-082, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    10. Bequet, Ludovic, 2021. "Agricultural productivity and land inequality. Evidence from the Philippines," MPRA Paper 108131, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Samuels, David & Vargas, Thomas R., 2023. "Democracy, rural inequality, and education spending," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 162(C).
    12. Albertus, Michael & Diaz-Cayeros, Alberto & Magaloni, Beatriz & Weingast, Barry R., 2016. "Authoritarian Survival and Poverty Traps: Land Reform in Mexico," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 154-170.
    13. Falkinger, Josef & Grossmann, Volker, 2013. "Oligarchic land ownership, entrepreneurship, and economic development," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 206-215.
    14. Sonia Bhalotra & Abhishek Chakravarty & Dilip Mookherjee & Francisco J. Pino, 2019. "Property Rights and Gender Bias: Evidence from Land Reform in West Bengal," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(2), pages 205-237, April.
    15. Benson, Allison L., 2021. "From targeted private benefits to public goods: land, distributive politics and changing political conditions in Colombia," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 112700, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    16. Mendola, Mariapia & Simtowe, Franklin, 2015. "The Welfare Impact of Land Redistribution: Evidence from a Quasi-Experimental Initiative in Malawi," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 53-69.
    17. Deininger, Klaus & Jin, Songqing & Nagarajan, Hari K., 2008. "Efficiency and equity impacts of rural land rental restrictions: Evidence from India," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 52(5), pages 892-918, July.
    18. Deininger, Klaus & Yadav, Vandana, 2011. "Long-term Effects of Land Reform on Human Capital Accumulation: Evidence from West Bengal," WIDER Working Paper Series 082, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    19. Nina Boberg-Fazlic & Markus Lampe & Pablo Martinelli Lasheras & Paul Sharp, 2020. "Winners and Losers from Enclosure: Evidence from Danish Land Inequality 1682-1895," Working Papers 0178, European Historical Economics Society (EHES).
    20. Aragón, Fernando M., 2015. "Do better property rights improve local income?: Evidence from First Nations' treaties," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 43-56.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
    • P51 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - Comparative Analysis of Economic Systems
    • O13 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:deveco:v:139:y:2019:i:c:p:50-68. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/devec .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.