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Are all perks solely perks? Evidence from corporate jets

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  • Lee, Lian Fen
  • Lowry, Michelle
  • Shu, Susan

Abstract

While shareholders have strong incentives to limit value-destroying perquisite consumption, it is challenging to identify such perquisites. Many corporate assets that enable forms of perquisite consumption also provide operational benefits. Corporate jets represent a potent example. We find business-related flights increase firm performance. Our results also highlight the channels through which jet use can either enhance or destroy firm value. Consistent with the benefits of information gathering and monitoring, firms with soft and complex information that is difficult to transmit remotely are more likely to fly to company subsidiaries and plants, and these flights positively affect firm value. In contrast, among firms with weak governance structures where flights are more likely motivated by agency factors, jet use is more likely to be value-decreasing. The ability to differentiate has important implications in today's activism environment.

Suggested Citation

  • Lee, Lian Fen & Lowry, Michelle & Shu, Susan, 2018. "Are all perks solely perks? Evidence from corporate jets," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 460-473.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:corfin:v:48:y:2018:i:c:p:460-473
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.11.014
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    Cited by:

    1. Li, Bin & Yao, Yao & Shahab, Yasir & Li, Hai-Xia & Ntim, Collins G., 2020. "Parent-subsidiary dispersion and executive excess perks consumption," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
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    3. D. Daniel Keum, 2021. "Innovation, short‐termism, and the cost of strong corporate governance," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(1), pages 3-29, January.
    4. Chan, Chia-Ying & Nishikawa, Takeshi & Williams, Thomas C., 2023. "CEO perquisite compensation and M&A performance," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 162-177.
    5. Lifang Chen & Minghui Han & Yong Li & William L. Megginson & Hao Zhang, 2022. "Foreign ownership and corporate excess perks," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 53(1), pages 72-93, February.
    6. Chia-Ying Chan & Iftekhar Hasan & Chih-Yung Lin, 2021. "Agency cost of CEO perquisites in bank loan contracts," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 56(4), pages 1221-1258, May.
    7. Andrew M. Bauer & Junxiong Fang & Jeffrey Pittman & Yinqi Zhang & Yuping Zhao, 2020. "How Aggressive Tax Planning Facilitates the Diversion of Corporate Resources: Evidence from Path Analysis†," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 37(3), pages 1882-1913, September.
    8. Hong, Yun & Yao, Youfu, 2024. "Can comment letters impact excess perks? Evidence from China," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 91(C).
    9. Bushee, Brian J. & Gerakos, Joseph & Lee, Lian Fen, 2018. "Corporate jets and private meetings with investors," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 358-379.
    10. Xi, Dan & Wu, Yuze & Wang, Xue & Fu, Zhe, 2023. "Corporate social responsibility and excess perks," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
    11. Yifan Zhan & Hung-Gay Fung & Wai Kin Leung, 2024. "Perk consumption and CEO turnover," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 62(4), pages 1525-1568, May.
    12. Pantelaki, Evangelia & Papatheodorou, Andreas, 2022. "Behind the scenes of glamour: A systematic literature review of the business aviation sector," Journal of Air Transport Management, Elsevier, vol. 105(C).

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