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The effect of executive stock option delta and vega on the spin-off decision

Author

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  • Mieszko Mazur

    (LEM - Lille économie management - UMR 9221 - UA - Université d'Artois - UCL - Université catholique de Lille - ULCO - Université du Littoral Côte d'Opale - Université de Lille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Galla Salganik-Shoshan

Abstract

We investigate the role of CEO incentives around asset restructuring known as corporate spin-off. More specifically, we focus on executive stock option delta and vega vis-à-vis changes in firm value and firm riskiness in response to the corporate spin-off. Controlling for self-selection of the spin-off decision, we find that executive stock option vega is positively related to changes in firm value as well as changes in firm risk. Conversely, we find that executive stock option delta is negatively related to changes in firm value and firm risk. Finally, we estimate the Fazzari et al. (1988) investment model and show that at the business segment level, CEO incentives are positively linked to capital spending. Overall, our study extends the current literature by documenting the role of executive stock option delta and vega in the context of corporate spin-offs.

Suggested Citation

  • Mieszko Mazur & Galla Salganik-Shoshan, 2018. "The effect of executive stock option delta and vega on the spin-off decision," Post-Print hal-02116144, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02116144
    DOI: 10.1016/j.qref.2018.11.003
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    Cited by:

    1. Liu, Zhe & Liu, Xin & Lan, Kefan & Wang, Haijun & Li, Qihui, 2025. "Can spin-offs enhance corporate market value?," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 77(PB).
    2. Niklas Kreilkamp & Sascha Matanovic & Maximilian Schmidt & Arnt Wöhrmann, 2023. "How executive incentive design affects risk-taking: a literature review," Review of Managerial Science, Springer, vol. 17(7), pages 2349-2374, October.
    3. Le, Trinh Hue & Oliver, Barry & Tan, Kelvin Jui Keng, 2022. "Nowhere to hide: Response of corporate restructuring activities to mandatory segment disclosure," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 76(C).
    4. Zhu, Chunhui & Zhang, Teng & Li, Shaoyu, 2021. "Why more restricted stocks, less stock options?--An explanation based on the preference of regulators of China?," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
    5. Huang, Yin-Siang & Lee, Cheng-Few & Lin, Chih-Yung, 2023. "Applications of fixed effect models to managerial risk-taking incentives," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 249-261.
    6. Nuru M. Ahmed & Jianfeng Wu, 2021. "Diversifying or Focused Acquisition? The Influence of CEOs Temporal Focus on Corporate Acquisition Target Choice and the Moderating Role of Corporate Governance," International Journal of Science and Business, IJSAB International, vol. 5(4), pages 80-104.
    7. Chen, Han-Sheng & Lin, Ying-Chou & Lin, Yu-Chen, 2024. "Reexamining information asymmetry related to corporate spin-offs," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 190-205.
    8. Han, Feng & Qin, Qi & Peabody, S. Drew, 2022. "Does incentive conflict between CEOs and CFOs benefit firms? Implications for corporate decision-making," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).

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