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Corporate equity ownership, investment, and product market relationships

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  • Clayton, Matthew J.
  • Jorgensen, Bjorn N.

Abstract

This paper examines the effect of corporate equity ownership on investment when firms have product market relationships. Firms have incentives to hold long equity positions when their products are complements. These equity positions induce the firms to increase their real investment expenditures. In contrast, firms have incentives to hold short equity positions when their products are substitutes. These short positions commit the firms to a more aggressive product market stance, and also result in increased real investment expenditures. Our model offers an explanation for the empirical relationship between the establishment of corporate equity stakes and increased investment spending documented by Allen and Phillips (2000).

Suggested Citation

  • Clayton, Matthew J. & Jorgensen, Bjorn N., 2011. "Corporate equity ownership, investment, and product market relationships," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(5), pages 1377-1388.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:corfin:v:17:y:2011:i:5:p:1377-1388
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.08.001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Fee, C. Edward & Hadlock, Charles J. & Pierce, Joshua R., 2012. "What happens in acquisitions?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 584-597.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corporate equity holdings; Investments; Strategic interactions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

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