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Do venture capitalists give founders their walking papers?

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  • Heger, Diana
  • Tykvová, Tereza

Abstract

We investigate the impact of venture capitalists on the turnover of executives within a sample of nearly 46,500 German high-tech start-up companies founded between 1995 and 2004. We confirm that the presence of VCs increases the chances that the company will change the structure of its initial executive team. For the purposes of our analysis, we distinguish between different types of changes (somebody is replaced, the team is enlarged, the team shrinks). Additionally, we take a closer look at the subsample of venture-backed companies. We find that a small distance between the VCs and the companies they finance, as well as a larger total stake in the company owned by the VCs, goes hand-in-hand with an increased probability of changes in the initial executive teams.

Suggested Citation

  • Heger, Diana & Tykvová, Tereza, 2009. "Do venture capitalists give founders their walking papers?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 15(5), pages 613-625, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:corfin:v:15:y:2009:i:5:p:613-625
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    2. Fryges, Helmut & Kohn, Karsten & Ullrich, Katrin, 2011. "The Interdependence of R&D Activity and Debt Financing of Young Firms," IZA Discussion Papers 6217, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    3. Emma Galli & Danilo Valerio Mascia & Stefania Patrizia Sonia Rossi, 2018. "Does Corruption Influence the Self-Restraint Attitude of Women-led SMEs towards Bank Lending?," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 64(3), pages 426-455.
    4. Patrick Gregori & Zulaicha Parastuty, 2021. "Investigating the process of entrepreneurial team member exits: a systematic review and future research directions," Review of Managerial Science, Springer, vol. 15(4), pages 847-878, May.
    5. Diana Heger & Katrin Hussinger, 2017. "Implications of uncertain patent rights for German start-ups’ commercialisation activities and access to external capital," Industry and Innovation, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 24(7), pages 753-773, October.
    6. Emma Galli & Danilo V. Mascia & Stefania P. S. Rossi, 2020. "Bank credit constraints for women‐led SMEs: Self‐restraint or lender bias?," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 26(4), pages 1147-1188, September.
    7. Heger, Diana & Hussinger, Katrin, 2013. "External capital access and new product launch in start-up firms with uncertain intellectual property rights," ZEW Discussion Papers 13-095, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.

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    Keywords

    Venture capital Executive turnover;

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