IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/chsofr/v174y2023ics0960077923007646.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Subsidy policy with punishment mechanism can promote voluntary vaccination behaviors in structured populations

Author

Listed:
  • Wang, Jingrui
  • Zhang, Huizhen
  • Jin, Xing
  • Ma, Leyu
  • Chen, Yueren
  • Wang, Chao
  • Zhao, Jian
  • An, Tianbo

Abstract

Subsidy policies have been a common way for governments and health organizations to encourage individuals’ voluntary vaccination behaviors. However, subsidy policies are often used in combination with punishment policies in reality. So far, few researchers have studied the combination of vaccination subsidy policies and punishment policies. In this study, a new subsidy policy with the punishment mechanism (P-TAR) is first introduced in the vaccination game to explore its impact on voluntary vaccination behaviors. P-TAR selects to subsidize punishers of the last season based on the degree, which is similar to targeted subsidy policy (S-TAR). We first adjust fines and punishment costs to explore how the punishment mechanism of P-TAR influences vaccination coverage and epidemic dynamics. The results show that vaccination coverage can be significantly improved when the fine is high and the punishment cost is low. By comparing P-TAR with S-TAR, we find that P-TAR can more effectively increase the number of vaccinated individuals to control the epidemic size. However, the P-TAR has a higher social cost than S-TAR. Through micro-analyzing the evolution of vaccination behaviors, the P-TAR effectively improves the voluntary vaccination behaviors of non-hub nodes, which is the main reason for P-TAR has more vaccinated individuals than S-TAR. To analyze the model robustness, experiments are conducted with larger network sizes. In addition, we compare the results of unvaccinated individuals who are sequentially punished by their surrounding punishers, as well as those who are punished only once. Finally, we perform the sensitivity analysis on the effectiveness of imperfect vaccine. Current results conclude that implementing strict policies usually incurs significant social costs, while effectively preventing epidemic spreading. We anticipate that this study can offer policymakers valuable insights into the balance between social costs and benefits when formulating vaccination policies.

Suggested Citation

  • Wang, Jingrui & Zhang, Huizhen & Jin, Xing & Ma, Leyu & Chen, Yueren & Wang, Chao & Zhao, Jian & An, Tianbo, 2023. "Subsidy policy with punishment mechanism can promote voluntary vaccination behaviors in structured populations," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 174(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:174:y:2023:i:c:s0960077923007646
    DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2023.113863
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0960077923007646
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.chaos.2023.113863?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bin Wu & Feng Fu & Long Wang, 2011. "Imperfect Vaccine Aggravates the Long-Standing Dilemma of Voluntary Vaccination," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 6(6), pages 1-7, June.
    2. Cui, Guang-Hai & Wang, Zhen & Li, Jun-Li & Jin, Xing & Zhang, Zhi-Wang, 2021. "Influence of precaution and dynamic post-indemnity based insurance policy on controlling the propagation of epidemic security risks in networks," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 392(C).
    3. Sun, Qingyi & Wang, Zhishuang & Zhao, Dawei & Xia, Chengyi & Perc, Matjaž, 2022. "Diffusion of resources and their impact on epidemic spreading in multilayer networks with simplicial complexes," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 164(C).
    4. Anwar A. Sayed, 2021. "The Progressive Public Measures of Saudi Arabia to Tackle Covid-19 and Limit Its Spread," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 18(2), pages 1-9, January.
    5. Jingrui Wang & Xing Jin & Yixuan Yang & Qingfang Chen & Zhen Wang & Hong Ding, 2021. "The spread of epidemic under voluntary vaccination with heterogeneous infection rates," International Journal of Modern Physics C (IJMPC), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 32(03), pages 1-14, March.
    6. Abel Brodeur & David Gray & Anik Islam & Suraiya Bhuiyan, 2021. "A literature review of the economics of COVID‐19," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(4), pages 1007-1044, September.
    7. Wang, Xinyu & Jia, Danyang & Gao, Shupeng & Xia, Chengyi & Li, Xuelong & Wang, Zhen, 2020. "Vaccination behavior by coupling the epidemic spreading with the human decision under the game theory," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 380(C).
    8. Bettina Rockenbach & Manfred Milinski, 2006. "The efficient interaction of indirect reciprocity and costly punishment," Nature, Nature, vol. 444(7120), pages 718-723, December.
    9. Matthew Goodkin-Gold & Michael Kremer & Christopher M. Snyder & Heidi L. Williams, 2020. "Optimal Vaccine Subsidies for Endemic and Epidemic Diseases," NBER Working Papers 28085, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Ichinose, Genki & Kurisaku, Takehiro, 2017. "Positive and negative effects of social impact on evolutionary vaccination game in networks," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 468(C), pages 84-90.
    11. Huang, Jiechen & Wang, Juan & Xia, Chengyi, 2020. "Role of vaccine efficacy in the vaccination behavior under myopic update rule on complex networks," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 130(C).
    12. Ding, Hong & Xu, Jia-Hao & Wang, Zhen & Ren, Yi-Zhi & Cui, Guang-Hai, 2018. "Subsidy strategy based on history information can stimulate voluntary vaccination behaviors on seasonal diseases," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 503(C), pages 390-399.
    13. Haozheng Xu & Yiwen Zhang & Xing Jin & Jingrui Wang & Zhen Wang, 2023. "The Evolution of Cooperation in Multigames with Uniform Random Hypergraphs," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 11(11), pages 1-11, May.
    14. Simon Gachter & Ernst Fehr, 2000. "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 980-994, September.
    15. Zhang, Yan, 2013. "The impact of other-regarding tendencies on the spatial vaccination game," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 209-215.
    16. Zhang, Hai-Feng & Shu, Pan-Pan & Wang, Zhen & Tang, Ming & Small, Michael, 2017. "Preferential imitation can invalidate targeted subsidy policies on seasonal-influenza diseases," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 294(C), pages 332-342.
    17. Xiuling Wang & Jie Wu & Gang Shu & Ya Li, 2014. "Punishment Based on Public Benefit Fund Significantly Promotes Cooperation," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 9(8), pages 1-8, August.
    18. Lee, Hsuan-Wei & Cleveland, Colin & Szolnoki, Attila, 2022. "Mercenary punishment in structured populations," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 417(C).
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Cui, Guang-Hai & Wang, Zhen & Li, Jun-Li & Jin, Xing & Zhang, Zhi-Wang, 2021. "Influence of precaution and dynamic post-indemnity based insurance policy on controlling the propagation of epidemic security risks in networks," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 392(C).
    2. Ding, Hong & Xu, Jia-Hao & Wang, Zhen & Ren, Yi-Zhi & Cui, Guang-Hai, 2018. "Subsidy strategy based on history information can stimulate voluntary vaccination behaviors on seasonal diseases," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 503(C), pages 390-399.
    3. Meng, Xueyu & Han, Sijie & Wu, Leilei & Si, Shubin & Cai, Zhiqiang, 2022. "Analysis of epidemic vaccination strategies by node importance and evolutionary game on complex networks," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 219(C).
    4. Benyun Shi & Guangliang Liu & Hongjun Qiu & Yu-Wang Chen & Shaoliang Peng, 2019. "Voluntary Vaccination through Perceiving Epidemic Severity in Social Networks," Complexity, Hindawi, vol. 2019, pages 1-13, February.
    5. Alam, Muntasir & Ida, Yuki & Tanimoto, Jun, 2021. "Abrupt epidemic outbreak could be well tackled by multiple pre-emptive provisions-A game approach considering structured and unstructured populations," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 143(C).
    6. Mateus Joffily & David Masclet & Charles N Noussair & Marie Claire Villeval, 2014. "Emotions, Sanctions, and Cooperation," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 80(4), pages 1002-1027, April.
    7. Helena Fornwagner & Oliver P. Hauser, 2022. "Climate Action for (My) Children," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 81(1), pages 95-130, January.
    8. Rockenbach, Bettina & Wolff, Irenaeus, 2009. "Institution design in social dilemmas: How to design if you must?," MPRA Paper 16922, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Nicklisch, Andreas & Grechenig, Kristoffel & Thöni, Christian, 2016. "Information-sensitive Leviathans," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 1-13.
    10. Nikos Nikiforakis & Helen Mitchell, 2014. "Mixing the carrots with the sticks: third party punishment and reward," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 17(1), pages 1-23, March.
    11. Gangadharan, Lata & Nikiforakis, Nikos & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2017. "Normative conflict and the limits of self-governance in heterogeneous populations," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 143-156.
    12. Balafoutas, Loukas & Nikiforakis, Nikos, 2012. "Norm enforcement in the city: A natural field experiment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(8), pages 1773-1785.
    13. Berge, Erling, 2023. "How can “tragedies of the commons” be resolved? Social dilemmas and legislation," CLTS Working Papers 1/23, Norwegian University of Life Sciences, Centre for Land Tenure Studies.
    14. Fudenberg, Drew & Pathak, Parag A., 2010. "Unobserved punishment supports cooperation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(1-2), pages 78-86, February.
    15. Quan, Ji & Nie, Jiacheng & Chen, Wenman & Wang, Xianjia, 2022. "Keeping or reversing social norms promote cooperation by enhancing indirect reciprocity," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 158(C).
    16. Si, Zehua & He, Zhixue & Shen, Chen & Tanimoto, Jun, 2023. "Speculative defectors as unexpected insulators of super cooperators in structured populations," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 170(C).
    17. Isamu Okada, 2020. "A Review of Theoretical Studies on Indirect Reciprocity," Games, MDPI, vol. 11(3), pages 1-17, July.
    18. Soya Miyoshi & Marko Jusup & Petter Holme, 2021. "Flexible imitation suppresses epidemics through better vaccination," Journal of Computational Social Science, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 709-720, November.
    19. Christoph Engel & Lilia Zhurakhovska, 2013. "Do Explicit Reasons Make Legal Intervention More Effective? An Experimental Study," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2013_16, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, revised Mar 2018.
    20. Bettina Rockenbach & Irenaeus Wolff, 2016. "Designing Institutions for Social Dilemmas," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 17(3), pages 316-336, August.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:174:y:2023:i:c:s0960077923007646. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Thayer, Thomas R. (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.journals.elsevier.com/chaos-solitons-and-fractals .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.