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Imperfect Vaccine Aggravates the Long-Standing Dilemma of Voluntary Vaccination

Author

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  • Bin Wu
  • Feng Fu
  • Long Wang

Abstract

Achieving widespread population immunity by voluntary vaccination poses a major challenge for public health administration and practice. The situation is complicated even more by imperfect vaccines. How the vaccine efficacy affects individuals' vaccination behavior has yet to be fully answered. To address this issue, we combine a simple yet effective game theoretic model of vaccination behavior with an epidemiological process. Our analysis shows that, in a population of self-interested individuals, there exists an overshooting of vaccine uptake levels as the effectiveness of vaccination increases. Moreover, when the basic reproductive number, , exceeds a certain threshold, all individuals opt for vaccination for an intermediate region of vaccine efficacy. We further show that increasing effectiveness of vaccination always increases the number of effectively vaccinated individuals and therefore attenuates the epidemic strain. The results suggest that ‘number is traded for efficiency’: although increases in vaccination effectiveness lead to uptake drops due to free-riding effects, the impact of the epidemic can be better mitigated.

Suggested Citation

  • Bin Wu & Feng Fu & Long Wang, 2011. "Imperfect Vaccine Aggravates the Long-Standing Dilemma of Voluntary Vaccination," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 6(6), pages 1-7, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:plo:pone00:0020577
    DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0020577
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    Cited by:

    1. Cui, Guang-Hai & Wang, Zhen & Li, Jun-Li & Jin, Xing & Zhang, Zhi-Wang, 2021. "Influence of precaution and dynamic post-indemnity based insurance policy on controlling the propagation of epidemic security risks in networks," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 392(C).
    2. Ge, Jingwen & Wang, Wendi, 2022. "Vaccination games in prevention of infectious diseases with application to COVID-19," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 161(C).
    3. Zhang, Hai-Feng & Shu, Pan-Pan & Wang, Zhen & Tang, Ming & Small, Michael, 2017. "Preferential imitation can invalidate targeted subsidy policies on seasonal-influenza diseases," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 294(C), pages 332-342.
    4. Kabir, KM Ariful & Kuga, Kazuki & Tanimoto, Jun, 2020. "The impact of information spreading on epidemic vaccination game dynamics in a heterogeneous complex network- A theoretical approach," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 132(C).
    5. Ariful Kabir, K.M. & Tanimoto, Jun, 2021. "A cyclic epidemic vaccination model: Embedding the attitude of individuals toward vaccination into SVIS dynamics through social interactions," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 581(C).
    6. Ning, Yi-Zi & Liu, Xin & Cheng, Hui-Min & Zhang, Zhong-Yuan, 2020. "Effects of social network structures and behavioral responses on the spread of infectious diseases," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 539(C).
    7. Zuo, Chao & Ling, Yuting & Zhu, Fenping & Ma, Xinyu & Xiang, Guochun, 2023. "Exploring epidemic voluntary vaccinating behavior based on information-driven decisions and benefit-cost analysis," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 447(C).
    8. Cai, Chao-Ran & Wu, Zhi-Xi & Guan, Jian-Yue, 2014. "Effect of vaccination strategies on the dynamic behavior of epidemic spreading and vaccine coverage," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 62, pages 36-43.
    9. Ding, Hong & Xu, Jia-Hao & Wang, Zhen & Ren, Yi-Zhi & Cui, Guang-Hai, 2018. "Subsidy strategy based on history information can stimulate voluntary vaccination behaviors on seasonal diseases," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 503(C), pages 390-399.
    10. Kejriwal, Saransh & Sheth, Sarjan & Silpa, P.S. & Sarkar, Sumit & Guha, Apratim, 2022. "Attaining herd immunity to a new infectious disease through multi-stage policies incentivising voluntary vaccination," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 154(C).
    11. Benyun Shi & Guangliang Liu & Hongjun Qiu & Yu-Wang Chen & Shaoliang Peng, 2019. "Voluntary Vaccination through Perceiving Epidemic Severity in Social Networks," Complexity, Hindawi, vol. 2019, pages 1-13, February.
    12. Zhao, Shanshan & Pan, Qiuhui & Zhu, Wenqiang & He, Mingfeng, 2023. "How “punishing evil and promoting good” promotes cooperation in social dilemma," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 438(C).
    13. Kabir, K.M. Ariful & Tanimoto, Jun, 2019. "Evolutionary vaccination game approach in metapopulation migration model with information spreading on different graphs," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 41-55.
    14. Kabir, K.M. Ariful, 2021. "How evolutionary game could solve the human vaccine dilemma," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 152(C).
    15. Li, Qiu & Li, MingChu & Lv, Lin & Guo, Cheng & Lu, Kun, 2017. "A new prediction model of infectious diseases with vaccination strategies based on evolutionary game theory," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 51-60.
    16. Wang, Jingrui & Zhang, Huizhen & Jin, Xing & Ma, Leyu & Chen, Yueren & Wang, Chao & Zhao, Jian & An, Tianbo, 2023. "Subsidy policy with punishment mechanism can promote voluntary vaccination behaviors in structured populations," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 174(C).
    17. Kabir, K.M. Ariful & Kuga, Kazuki & Tanimoto, Jun, 2019. "Effect of information spreading to suppress the disease contagion on the epidemic vaccination game," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 180-187.

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