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Punishment Based on Public Benefit Fund Significantly Promotes Cooperation

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  • Xiuling Wang
  • Jie Wu
  • Gang Shu
  • Ya Li

Abstract

In prisoner's dilemma game (shortly, PD game), punishment is most frequently used to promote cooperation. However, outcome varies when different punishment approaches are applied. Here the PD game is studied on a square lattice when different punishment patterns are adopted. As is known to all, tax system, a common tool to adjust the temperature of the economy, is widely used in human society. Inspired by this philosophy, players in this study would pay corresponding taxes in accordance with their payoff level. In this way, public benefit fund is established consequently and it would be utilized to punish defectors. There are two main methods for punishing: slight intensity of punishment (shortly, SLP) and severe intensity of punishment (shortly, SEP). When the totaling of public benefit fund keeps relatively fixed, SLP extends further, which means more defectors would be punished; by contrast, SEP has a smaller coverage. It is of interest to verify whether these two measures can promote cooperation and which one is more efficient. Simulate results reveal that both of them can promote cooperation remarkably. Specifically speaking, SLP shows constant advantage from the point of view either of fractions of cooperation or average payoff.

Suggested Citation

  • Xiuling Wang & Jie Wu & Gang Shu & Ya Li, 2014. "Punishment Based on Public Benefit Fund Significantly Promotes Cooperation," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 9(8), pages 1-8, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:plo:pone00:0105126
    DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0105126
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    Cited by:

    1. Deng, Xinyang & Zhang, Zhipeng & Deng, Yong & Liu, Qi & Chang, Shuhua, 2016. "Self-adaptive win-stay-lose-shift reference selection mechanism promotes cooperation on a square lattice," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 284(C), pages 322-331.
    2. Li, Ya & Chen, Shanxiong & Niu, Ben, 2018. "Reward depending on public funds stimulates cooperation in spatial prisoner’s dilemma games," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 38-45.
    3. Wang, Jingrui & Zhang, Huizhen & Jin, Xing & Ma, Leyu & Chen, Yueren & Wang, Chao & Zhao, Jian & An, Tianbo, 2023. "Subsidy policy with punishment mechanism can promote voluntary vaccination behaviors in structured populations," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 174(C).

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