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Impact of the Guaranteed Health Plan with a single community premium on the demand for private health insurance in Chile

Author

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  • Bitrán, Eduardo
  • Duarte, Fabián
  • Fernandes, Dalila
  • Villena, Marcelo

Abstract

In 2012, a Guaranteed Health Plan for the private health system was submitted to the Chilean National Congress, with the aim of offering a standardized flat-rate health-care plan. This paper evaluates the impact that the introduction of this plan would have on the demand for health insurance. The results suggest that the private insurance portfolio would shrink by 12.39%, which means that around 400,000 people would switch to the public system, thereby exacerbating the adverse-selection problem faced by the system and imposing an additional fiscal burden of US$ 200 million per year.

Suggested Citation

  • Bitrán, Eduardo & Duarte, Fabián & Fernandes, Dalila & Villena, Marcelo, 2017. "Impact of the Guaranteed Health Plan with a single community premium on the demand for private health insurance in Chile," Revista CEPAL, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), December.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecr:col070:43448
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Friedman, Bernard, 1974. "Risk Aversion and the Consumer Choice of Health Insurance Option," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 56(2), pages 209-214, May.
    2. Sapelli, Claudio & Vial, Bernardita, 2003. "Self-selection and moral hazard in Chilean health insurance," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 459-476, May.
    3. Duarte, Fabian, 2012. "Price elasticity of expenditure across health care services," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(6), pages 824-841.
    4. Ricardo Sanhueza & Jaime Ruiz-Tagle, 2002. "Choosing Health Insurance in a Dual Health Care System: The Chilean Case," Journal of Applied Economics, Universidad del CEMA, vol. 5, pages 157-184, May.
    5. David M. Cutler & Sarah J. Reber, 1998. "Paying for Health Insurance: The Trade-Off between Competition and Adverse Selection," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 113(2), pages 433-466.
    6. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
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