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Political Connections and Debt Access: The Case of Tunisian Firms

Author

Listed:
  • Fayrouz Bencheikh

    (Higher Institute of Management, Tunisia,)

  • Neila Boulila Taktak

    (Higher Institute of Management, Tunisia.)

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to study the effect of political connections on debt access in the case of Tunisian firms before and after the 2011 uprising. The results show that the impact of political connections on debt access differs according to three criteria: Firstly, according to debt maturity, secondly according to the degree of political connections, and finally according to the sub-period studied.

Suggested Citation

  • Fayrouz Bencheikh & Neila Boulila Taktak, 2017. "Political Connections and Debt Access: The Case of Tunisian Firms," International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, Econjournals, vol. 7(3), pages 180-185.
  • Handle: RePEc:eco:journ1:2017-03-25
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Debt Access; Political Connections; Tunisia;

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies

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