Search Profiling With Partial Knowledge of Deterrence
Consider the choice of a profiling policy where decisions to search for evidence of crime may vary with observable covariates of the persons at risk of search. I pose a planning problem whose objective is to minimise the social cost of crime and search. The consequences of a search rule depend on the extent to which search deters crime. I study the planning problem when the planner has partial knowledge of deterrence. I show how the planner can eliminate dominated search rules and how he can use the minimax or minimax-regret criterion to choose an undominated rule. Copyright 2006 The Author(s). Journal compilation Royal Economic Society 2006.
Volume (Year): 116 (2006)
Issue (Month): 515 (November)
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