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Could you spare me a moment? A model of primary data collection by statistics institutes

Author

Listed:
  • Marcelo de C. Griebeler

    (Luiz de Queiroz College of Agriculture, University of São Paulo)

  • Felipe Wolk Teixeira

    (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics)

Abstract

We study the strategic interaction between a statistical institute and a survey respondent (either a firm or a household). The respondent must decide whether to acquire the information required by the institute, thereby incurring a private cost. After receiving the reported data, the institute chooses whether to audit the respondent's declaration. The key innovation of our model is to introduce two-sided asymmetric information: both the cost of acquiring the information and the cost of auditing are private and known only to the respective agent. We characterize a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and show that there is substitutability between the magnitude of the punishment for misreporting and the probability of auditing. Our framework allows for both positive and normative analysis of the challenges faced by statistical agencies in data collection, providing insights into how enforcement mechanisms can be designed to balance deterrence and audit costs.

Suggested Citation

  • Marcelo de C. Griebeler & Felipe Wolk Teixeira, 2026. "Could you spare me a moment? A model of primary data collection by statistics institutes," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 46(2), pages 816-827.
  • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-26-00569
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Allingham, Michael G. & Sandmo, Agnar, 1972. "Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 323-338, November.
    2. Bound, John & Brown, Charles & Mathiowetz, Nancy, 2001. "Measurement error in survey data," Handbook of Econometrics, in: J.J. Heckman & E.E. Leamer (ed.), Handbook of Econometrics, edition 1, volume 5, chapter 59, pages 3705-3843, Elsevier.
    3. Douglas S. Massey & Roger Tourangeau, 2013. "Where Do We Go from Here? Nonresponse and Social Measurement," The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, , vol. 645(1), pages 222-236, January.
    4. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-1451, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    JEL classification:

    • C8 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

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